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Library | Item Barcode | Call Number | Material Type | Item Category 1 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Searching... | 30000010192420 | QA269 A43 2007 | Open Access Book | Book | Searching... |
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Summary
Summary
In recent years game theory has had a substantial impact on computer science, especially on Internet- and e-commerce-related issues. Algorithmic Game Theory, first published in 2007, develops the central ideas and results of this exciting area in a clear and succinct manner. More than 40 of the top researchers in this field have written chapters that go from the foundations to the state of the art. Basic chapters on algorithmic methods for equilibria, mechanism design and combinatorial auctions are followed by chapters on important game theory applications such as incentives and pricing, cost sharing, information markets and cryptography and security. This definitive work will set the tone of research for the next few years and beyond. Students, researchers, and practitioners alike need to learn more about these fascinating theoretical developments and their widespread practical application.
Table of Contents
| IntroductionNoam Nisan and Tim Roughgarden and Eva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani |
| Part I Computing in Games |
| 1 Basic solution concepts and computational issuesEva Tardos and Vijay V. Vazirani |
| 2 Algorithms for equilibriaChristos Papadimitriou |
| 3 Equilibrium computation for games in strategic and extensive formBernhard von Stengel |
| 4 Learning, regret minimization and correlated equilibriaAvrim Blum and Yishay Mansour |
| 5 Graphical gamesMichael J. Kearns |
| 6 Cryptography and game theoryYevgeniy Dodis and Tal Rabin |
| 7 Combinatorial algorithms for market equilibria Vijay V. Vazirani |
| 8 Computation of market equilibria by convex programmingBruno Codenotti and Kasturi Varadarajan |
| Part II Algorithmic Mechanism Design |
| 9 Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists)Noam Nisan |
| 10 Mechanism design without moneyJames Schummer and Rakesh V. Vohra |
| 11 Combinatorial auctionsNoam Nisan and Liad Blumrosen |
| 12 Computationally efficient approximation mechanismsRon Lavi |
| 13 Profit maximization in mechanism designJason Hartline and Anna Karlin |
| 14 Distributed algorithmic mechanism designJoan Feigenbaum and Michael Schapira and Scott Shenker |
| 15 Cost sharingKamal Jain and Mohammad Mahdian |
| 16 On-line mechanismsDavid C. Parkes |
| Part III Quantifying the Inefficiency of Equilibria |
| 17 Introduction to the inefficiency of equillibriaTim Roughgarden and Eva Tardos |
| 18 Routing gamesTim Roughgarden |
| 19 Inefficiency of equilibria in network formation gamesEva Tardos|vTom Wexler |
| 20 Selfish load-balancingBerthold Vocking |
| 21 Efficiency loss and the design of scalable resource allocation mechanismsRamesh Johari |
| Part IV Additional Topics |
| 22 Incentives and pricing in communication networksAsuman Ozdaglar and R. Srikant |
| 23 Incentives in peer-to-peer systemsJohn Chuang and Michal Feldman and Moshe Babaioff |
| 24 Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issuesJon Kleinberg |
| 25 Incentives and information securityRoss Anderson and Tyler Moore and Shishir Nagaraja and Andy Ozment |
| 26 Computational aspects of information marketsDavid M. Pennock and Rahul Sami |
| 27 Manipulation-resistant reputation systemsEric Friedman and Paul Resnick and Rahul Sami |
| 28 Sponsored search auctionsSebastien Lahaie and David M. Pennock and Amin Saberi and Rakesh V. Vohra |
| 29 Algorithmic issues in evolutionary game theoryMichael Kearns and Siddharth Suri |
