Available:*
Library | Item Barcode | Call Number | Material Type | Item Category 1 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Searching... | 30000010343863 | UA840 W55 2015 | Open Access Book | Book | Searching... |
On Order
Summary
Summary
At Indian independence in 1947, the country's founders worried that the army India inherited--conservative and dominated by officers and troops drawn disproportionately from a few "martial" groups--posed a real threat to democracy. They also saw the structure of the army, with its recruitment on the basis of caste and religion, as incompatible with their hopes for a new secular nation.
India has successfully preserved its democracy, however, unlike many other colonial states that inherited imperial "divide and rule" armies, and unlike its neighbor Pakistan, which inherited part of the same Indian army in 1947. As Steven I. Wilkinson shows, the puzzle of how this happened is even more surprising when we realize that the Indian Army has kept, and even expanded, many of its traditional "martial class" units, despite promising at independence to gradually phase them out.
Army and Nation draws on uniquely comprehensive data to explore how and why India has succeeded in keeping the military out of politics, when so many other countries have failed. It uncovers the command and control strategies, the careful ethnic balancing, and the political, foreign policy, and strategic decisions that have made the army safe for Indian democracy. Wilkinson goes further to ask whether, in a rapidly changing society, these structures will survive the current national conflicts over caste and regional representation in New Delhi, as well as India's external and strategic challenges.
Reviews 1
Choice Review
Wilkinson (Yale Univ.) demonstrates that India consciously practiced "coup proofing" to make sure the army never attempted to seize power. The British, worried about the Indian army since the 1857 rebellion, practiced divide-and-rule. The Congress Party inherited this fear and the British designation of "martial classes" (e.g., Punjabis) especially suited for military service and heavily recruited. Other ethnic-linguistic groups (e.g., Bengalis) were drastically underrepresented in the ranks. Nehru and Defense Minister Krishna Menon watched the army like hawks, creating new units and paramilitary forces, recruiting from underrepresented groups, rotating and retiring generals, and keeping the defense budget low. India paid for heavy-handed civilian supervision in China's brief 1962 incursion. Wilkinson's best chapter is his contrast of India with Pakistan, which did everything wrong and suffers periodic coups. Wilkinson accepts the standard explanation that Congress was old, well organized, and institutionalized, whereas the Muslim League was an elite party, but he adds that Pakistan's leaders never attempted India-style coup proofing. Especially bad was Pakistan's indifference to tension between its Punjabi army and its Bengali taxpayers. A thorough, detailed, scholarly work and major contribution to studies of praetorianism. Summing Up: Recommended. Graduate, research, and professional collections. --Michael G. Roskin, emeritus, Lycoming College
