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Library | Item Barcode | Call Number | Material Type | Item Category 1 | Status |
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Summary
Summary
We draw distinctions among people due to characteristics that they posses or lack. While some distinctions are benign, many are morally troubling. Hellman here develops a general theory of discrimination and shows that many familiar ideas about when discrimination is wrong do not adequately explain our widely-shared intuitions.
Reviews 1
Choice Review
Hellman's pointedly and appropriately titled monograph puts forth a general theory of discrimination--why it is sometimes permissible and sometimes impermissible to draw distinctions among people on the basis of a certain trait. Beginning with her "bedrock moral principle--the equal moral worth of all persons," she refines the question: when does drawing distinctions among people fail to treat those affected as persons of equal moral worth? Her answer is when it demeans any of the people affected. In subsequent chapters, Hellman (Univ. of Maryland School of Law) defines and explores what "demeaning" is; how one determines whether a distinction does or does not demean; and how people deal with disagreement on that question. Part 2 elucidates and critiques alternative answers to the moral question raised by the fact that "it is often desirable and sometimes necessary to treat people differently"--what she call the "discrimination puzzle." Hellman's analysis does not remove all ambiguity, and there is room for alternative conclusions using her criterion, but she has provided a coherent, thoughtful approach that advances understanding of this intractable problem. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates and above. P. J. Galie Canisius College
Table of Contents
| Introduction: The Discrimination Puzzle | p. 1 |
| I When Is Discrimination Wrong? | |
| 1 The Basic Idea | p. 13 |
| 2 Demeaning and Wrongful Discrimination | p. 34 |
| 3 Interpretation and Disagreement | p. 59 |
| II Considering Alternatives | |
| Introduction to Part II | p. 89 |
| 4 Merit, Entitlement, and Desert | p. 93 |
| 5 Accuracy and Irrationality | p. 114 |
| 6 Is It the Thought that Counts? | p. 138 |
| Conclusion | p. 169 |
| Notes | p. 175 |
| Acknowledgments | p. 201 |
| Index | p. 203 |
