Excerpts

The Modern Originals FREDERICK THE GREAT (1713-1786) AND NAPOLEON (1769-1821) This chapter differs from those that follow in that it largely comprises aphorisms. The intent was to make it short, but still give the major ideas of Frederick and Napoleon, to whom the commanders in the chapters that follow owe a debt. Backgrounds Among purveyors of wisdom on the art of war, Frederick the Great and Napoleon have surely had the most influence over the past 200 years. For whatever reasons, their pronouncements are strikingly similar on many subjects. Thus it seems reasonable to devote a single chapter to them and their thoughts. The future Frederick II of Prussia had a miserable boyhood because his soldier-father, Frederick-William I (1688-1740), was enraged by his intellectual interests and flute-playing. Napoleon, future emperor of the French, grew up in Italian-speaking Corsica in a normal, happy home-if subject to his mother's stern discipline and religiosity. Frederick was "born to the purple," and Napoleon not, but both were trained to be officers-Frederick almost from birth, Napoleon from age 9 in royal French military schools. Frederick acceded to the throne in 1740, and almost immediately began using his army to enlarge his kingdom. He left the field in the middle of his first battle, Mollwitz (1741), because one of his father's old generals, in command, predicted defeat; the battle was later won nevertheless. Angry with himself, he thereafter led in person with almost insane bravery. Stories tell of spent musket balls falling from his coat when he stopped at soldiers' campfires. He fought two wars (1741-45) with Austria, and the Seven Years War (1757-63) (aided only by Great Britain, largely with money) against Austria, her German Empire, France, and Russia. His forte was tactical misdirection of the enemy, preceded by strategic surprise, by which he defeated armies much larger than his own. Napoleon was commissioned at 16, and at 24 was a general-thanks to his talent and the chaotic conditions of the French Revolutionary era. In 1796, at 26, he was given command of an army, and for 20 years he was the most feared general in Europe, fighting first for the French Republic, then his own Consulate and Empire. His forte was improvision , by which (until all his enemies finally allied against him) he steadily won over armies larger than his own. Despite the differences in the early lives of Napoleon and Frederick, there were similarities in their habits and personalities. For example, they were both avid readers. "At the age of puberty," Napoleon said at St. Helena, "... reading became a passion pushed to the edge of rage." He had a specially bound library of almost 1,000 books that he carried on campaign. Frederick, during one period of his life, lived on books and coffee, day and night, until he collapsed. Both were hypersensitive, nearly paranoid-which was useful on campaign, where both rode herd on their subordinates relentlessly, and let their minds run on how to counter every possible move the enemy might make. Both were men whose lives were their work. Both seemed perpetually awake in the field; and in their palaces, they kept schedules night and day, sleeping for a few hours around midnight, rising to work, returning to bed before dawn, rising before the normal business day began. Both believed in the heavy use of artillery. Frederick, whenever possible, had seven guns per 1,000 men. Napoleon, whose guns were more maneuverable and (on average) of heavier caliber, had only two to three per 1,000 men. But their purposes were the same-to spare the infantry-to open avenues for attack. Both were steadfast (or stubborn) to the extreme; neither would ever quit . Both fought where possible to annihilate enemy armies, though both wanted a "profit" from ultimate victory-territorial or otherwise. Ritter says Frederick fought battles of annihilation but wanted to defeat the Habsburgs only to acquire Silesia. Frederick wrote: "Our wars should be short and quickly fought.... A long war destroys ... our [army's] discipline; depopulates the country, and exhausts our resources." Napoleon tried to shorten his wars (and end his campaigns) with a crushing victory, as at Austerlitz, which campaign was fought in three months and netted him two new Napoleonic kingdoms, Naples and Holland. Like Frederick, Napoleon convinced his troops that he was fearless, even unkillable, and that success made him "worth 40,000 men" on the battlefield. Delbruck writes of Frederick: "Why did [opposing commanders[ not take advantage of the favorable opportunities that he offered them frequently enough? They did not dare. They believed him capable of everything." Napoleon preferred that the troops see him as the man of destiny-simultaneously the personification of French grandeur and glory and the "Little Corporal," unafraid (as at Lodi, 1796) to get dirty while aiming the cannon himself. His appearances left unforgettable images that were the stuff of tales of veterans and their descendants for generations. Like Frederick, Napoleon was a patron and friend to his troops, but demanding, severe, and downright nasty with the officers. He got generals and marshals to obey in knee-jerk fashion with violent abuse for any mistakes (including some that were really his), balanced by generous gifts of money, lands, tides, and medals. Drill sergeants and horse trainers also use this method. Did Napoleon emulate Frederick, or were the two just similar in thought and habit? No one will ever know. That Napoleon admired the Prussian king is certain. In 1788, as a lieutenant, he made notes on books on Frederick and prussia. They list events, battles, dates, names, and (a lifetime fascination) figures-poor evidence that he learned any of Frederick's secrets. All the same, he always held that Frederick was the greatest modern general; he visited the king's tomb in Potsdam after defeating the Prussian army (1806). During his final exile on St. Helena (1815-21), he analyzed Frederick's campaigns and dismissed his critics: They reproach the great captain [for a variety of mistakes] ... But his faults are eclipsed by great actions, beautiful maneuvers, fearless decisions which allowed him to walk away victorious from straggles where the odds were against him. He was greatest in the most critical moments , which is the highest tribute one can make to his character. Napoleon agreed with Frederick on many basic tenets, the major exception being the king's tactical oblique order , which Napoleon thought was a drillfield maneuver that Frederick never used in battle; he found it amusing that foreign observers of his maneuvers recommended their armies adopt it. Both were intellectuals as well as soldiers; Napoleon was elected to the French Institut while a general of the Republic, wrote essays and novellas in his youth, dictated voluminous memoirs in exile on St. Helena, and left behind hundreds of edicts and orders amid thousands of letters. Frederick left 30 volumes of Oeuvres, mostly in French, including his Principes généraux de la guerre and instructions to his generals, and much more. * * * Paired below are the opinions of Frederick and Napoleon on various subjects. Translations are largely from Frederick's Principes and Napoleon's Correspondance , with a few additions from the compilations of Picard, Palluel, and Dansette. * * * Great Commanders Are Born FREDERICK: What is called the coup d'oeil [sweep of the eye] ... consists of two things, of which one is the talent to instantly judge the number of [the enemy]. That can be acquired by practice.... The other talent, which is altogether superior, is [the ability] to instantly judge all the advantages that can be drawn from the terrain; one can acquire and perfect that talent provided one was born with a genius for war. NAPOLEON: The art of war ... can be learned neither from books nor from practice [experience]: it is a touch for command that constitutes a genius for war. My presence was indispensable anywhere I wanted to win a victory. It was a flaw in my armor: None of my generals had the [personal] force for a large independent command. Attitude While on Campaign FREDERICK: One should constantly analyze the situation in which one finds oneself: What plan would I form if I were the enemy? After imagining several, one should think about what means to use to counter the plans, and immediately correct anything that is defective in one's position. NAPOLEON: A great captain ought to say to himself several times a day: If the enemy army should appear on my front, or my right or on my left, what will I do? If he is embarrassed by the question, he is badly posted, he is not in proper order, he must remedy that. Unity of Command FREDERICK: [A commander] should act on his own [ doit agir par lui-même ] The secret of war is never found in councils of war. The general [should] talk of war from time to time with the most enlightened generals of his army ... and if, in free conversation, they offer good advice, he should profit by it without remarking who has found a good thing ; but once it is executed with success, he should say, in the presence of a big group of officers: It is to so-and-so that I owe the success in this affair. You flatter the egos [ amour-propre ] of others ... you win friends. NAPOLEON: In military operations, I consulted no one but myself. One bad general ... is worth more than two good ones. Unity of command is the first necessity of war. It is vital ... to concentrate the greatest possible forces on the field of battle, to profit by all opportunities, for fortune is a woman; if you lose her today, don't expect to get her back tomorrow. Keeping Forces Together FREDERICK: It is an ancient rule of war ... if you separate your forces, you will be beaten in detail; if you want to give battle, assemble as many troops as you can; no better way is known to put them to better use. * * * NAPOLEON: The art of war does not consist of dividing the troops. General rule: When you want to fight a battle, assemble all your forces, do not neglect any; one battalion can sometimes decide the day. Generals FREDERICK: A general considered audacious in another country is only ordinary in [Prussia]; [our general] is able to dare and undertake anything it is possible for men to execute [do]. How many contradictory virtues enter into the makeup of a general! I suppose, he should be a gentleman and good citizen, qualities without which skills [in] the art of war are more pernicious than useful. One also asks that he should be devious [and] straightforward, gentle and severe, defiant without ceasing and always tranquil, sensitive about humanity and sometimes free with the blood of soldiers, intellectual, personally active, discreet, profound, educated in everything, not forgetting one thing to do another, and not neglecting the little details that are so critical to the support of great things. NAPOLEON: Military genius is a gift from God, but the most essential quality of a generalin-chief is the strength of character and resolution to win at all costs. In war, men are nothing; it is one man [the commander] who is everything. The tactics, ... the science of the engineer and artilleryman can be learned from books ... like geometry; but knowledge of the higher elements of war can be acquired only through the study of the history of the wars ... of the great commanders and through experience. There are no precise, determined rules; everything depends on the character that nature has given the general: ... the nature of the troops, the arms available, the season, and a thousand other circumstances that may never have arisen before. [The Romans] had fixed attack and defensive formations [ ordres de bataille constant ]; but, since the invention of firearms, the manner of occupying a position ... or giving battle depend on many different factors-and vary with circumstances ... the coup d'oeil militaire -the decision according to the experience or genius of the general-in chief-that is the main thing. [ Comment on Jomini's works :] Generals are beaten who ... follow the principles which they have been taught [ principes qu'on leur a inculqués ]. There are too many diverse elements in war. Offense and Defense FREDERICK : If I disapprove [and I do] of a totally defensive campaign, it is not because I think you can always fight a completely offensive war; but I ask that a general not feel badly about going on defense, and that he instead turn it into a ruse, excite the ego of his enemies, and induce them to make mistakes from which he can profit. NAPOLEON: The art of war consists of a well reasoned, extremely circumspect defense, and an audacious and rapid offense. A defensive war does not exclude the attack, just as the offensive does not exclude the defense. The Art of War FREDERICK: In war, one dons alternately the skin of the lion and the skin of the fox. Pretend feebleness or timidity. Tempt the enemy with an ostensibly stupid maneuver. Excite his vanity [ amour propre ]. The discipline of our troops is the foundation of the glory and preservation of [our] country. [Sometimes] the full details of the situation ought to oblige the general to yield [decide according] to his means and to prefer a practicable project to a brilliant one. NAPOLEON: Always remember three things: unity of forces, positive action, and firm resolution to perish [if need be] with glory. These are the grand principles of the military art that always gave me good fortune in all my operations. Death is nothing; to live defeated and without glory is to die every day. War can only be fought with force, decision, and ... determination; there can be no uncertainty or hesitation. The art of war is a simple art and all in execution ... it is all common sense; nothing about it is theoretical. A good general, good cadres, a good organization, good instruction, good discipline make good troops, independent of the cause for which they fight; however, it is true that fanaticism, love of country, national glory, can inspire young troops to advantage. The musket is the best war machine ever invented by man. In war, morale and opinion are the better part of reality. Continues... Excerpted from ON WAR AND LEADERSHIP by Owen Connelly Copyright © 2002 by Princeton University Press Excerpted by permission. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.