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Summary
Summary
The Smart Grid has the potential to revolutionize electricity delivery systems, and the security of its infrastructure is a vital concern not only for cyber-security practitioners, engineers, policy makers, and utility executives, but also for the media and consumers. Smart Grid Security: An End-to-End View of Security in the New Electrical Grid explores the important techniques, challenges, and forces that will shape how we achieve a secure twenty-first century electric grid.
Includes a Foreword by Michael Assante, President and CEO, National Board of Information Security Examiners
Following an overview of the components of the Smart Grid, the book delves into the evolution of security standards and regulations and examines ways in which the Smart Grid might be regulated. The authors discuss the technical details about how metering technology is being implemented and the likely threats and vulnerabilities that utilities will face. They address the home area network (HAN) and examine distribution and transmission--the foundation for the delivery of electricity, along with distributed generation, micro-grids, and operations.
The book explores future concepts--such as energy storage and the use of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs)--in addition to the concomitant risk for fraud and manipulation with stored energy. Consumer-related issues are discussed as they pertain to emerging ways of receiving and generating energy. The book examines dysfunctions ranging from inadvertent outages to cyber-attack and presents recommendations on how to respond to these incidents. It concludes with speculation of future cyber-security challenges and discusses new ways that the grid can be defended, such as better key management and protection.
Written in a style rigorous enough for the practitioner yet accessible to a broad audience, this comprehensive volume covers a topic that is becoming more critical to industry and consumers everywhere.
Author Notes
Gilbert (Gib) N. Sorebo is a chief cybersecurity Technologist and assistant vice president for SAIC where he assists government and private sector organizations in addressing cybersecurity risks and complying with legal and regulatory requirements. He has been working in the information technology industry for more than nineteen years in both the public and private sector. In addition to federal and state governments, Mr. Sorebo has done security consulting in the financial services, health care, and electricity sectors. He is currently responsible for coordinating cybersecurity activities in the energy sector companywide. He has been the co-lead of SAI C's Smart Grid Security practice where he established the SAI C Smart Grid Security Solutions Center for product security testing and solution development and contributes to a variety of other smart grid security research efforts.
Michael C. Echols is a cyber security consultant who specializes in the development and management of utilities' cyber security programs. This includes the development of governance models, policy development, and compliance. Michael has worked in Energy and Utility markets developing and delivering transformational cyber security solutions for Critical Infrastructure systems. Michael is recognized for his expertise in cyber security compliance and posture analysis for industrial control systems and smart grid technologies. He has worked in the public sector as a cyber security officer for the U.S. government, where he has applied security requirements from both NIST and NERC to industrial control systems, in real world situations. He has led efforts to assess, secure and remediate risk to Generation, Transmission, Distribution, and Advanced Residential Metering Systems for the U.S. government and major U.S. energy providers.
Table of Contents
Foreword | p. xv |
Preface | p. xix |
Authors | p. xxiii |
Acknowledgments | p. xxv |
Chapter 1 What Is the Smart Grid, and Why Should We Care about Security? | p. 1 |
1.1 Definitions: The Traditional Power Grid | p. 1 |
1.2 Definitions: What's a Smart Grid? | p. 3 |
1.3 Why Do We Need a Smarter Grid? | p. 7 |
1.4 Smart Grid Risks | p. 9 |
1.5 Smart Grid Risks versus Benefits | p. 12 |
Endnotes | p. 14 |
Chapter 2 The Smart Grid Evolution: Smart Grid Standards, Laws, and Industry Guidance | p. 17 |
2.1 Introduction | p. 17 |
2.2 Regulations, Smart Grid, and the Bulk Electric System | p. 20 |
2.3 Privacy Information Impacts on Smart Grid | p. 24 |
2.4 Security Standards | p. 27 |
2.5 Smart Grid Security Strategy | p. 31 |
2.6 Smart Grid Impacts | p. 38 |
2.7 Applying Security Control Frameworks to Smart Grid | p. 41 |
2.8 Managing the Overall Risk to Smart Grid | p. 46 |
Endnotes | p. 49 |
Chapter 3 Smart Metering: The First Security Challenge | p. 51 |
3.1 Introduction | p. 51 |
3.2 The Cost of Smart Metering | p. 52 |
3.3 Smart Metering Programs | p. 53 |
3.3.1 The Smart Meter Architecture | p. 57 |
3.3.2 In-Home Display | p. 58 |
3.3.3 Smart Meters | p. 59 |
3.3.4 Neighborhood Area Network | p. 60 |
3.3.5 Smart Meter Collectors | p. 61 |
3.3.6 Wide Area Network (WAN) | p. 62 |
3.3.7 Utility Demilitarized Zone | p. 64 |
3.3.8 Head End System | p. 64 |
3.4 Smart Meter Authentication | p. 64 |
3.5 Smart Metering Security | p. 67 |
3.6 Smart Meter Vendor Management | p. 67 |
3.7 Smart Meter Security Management | p. 70 |
3.7.1 AMI Vulnerabilities | p. 72 |
3.7.2 AMI Impacts | p. 74 |
Endnotes | p. 76 |
Chapter 4 Home Area Networking: Giving Consumers Control or Opening a Pandora's Box? | p. 79 |
4.1 Introduction | p. 79 |
4.2 Elements of the Home Area Network | p. 81 |
4.2.1 Energy Services Interface | p. 83 |
4.2.2 Programmable Communicating Thermostat (PCT) | p. 84 |
4.2.3 In-Home Display (IHD) and Energy Management System (EMS) | p. 85 |
4.2.4 Load Control and Smart Appliance | p. 86 |
4.2.5 HAN Nonelectric Meter | p. 87 |
4.2.6 Plug-In Electric Vehicle (PEV) and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) | p. 87 |
4.2.7 Mobile HAN Devices | p. 89 |
4.2.8 Other Devices | p. 90 |
4.3 HAN Communications | p. 91 |
4.4 HAN Commissioning, Registration, and Enrollment | p. 92 |
4.5 Defense-in-Depth and Other Security Solutions | p. 94 |
Endnotes | p. 96 |
Chapter 5 Distribution Automation: Moving from Legacy to Secure | p. 99 |
5.1 Introduction | p. 99 |
5.2 What Is the Distribution System? | p. 100 |
5.3 Distribution System Architecture | p. 102 |
5.3.1 Utility Field Sensors (Sensors) | p. 103 |
5.3.2 Utility Distribution and Feeder Meters | p. 103 |
5.3.3 Utility Field Controllers | p. 104 |
5.3.4 Local Access Network (LAN) | p. 104 |
5.3.5 Sensor/Meter Aggregator | p. 105 |
5.3.6 Wide Area Network (WAN) | p. 105 |
5.3.7 Data Center Access | p. 106 |
5.3.8 Sensor Head-End | p. 106 |
5.3.9 Meter Head-End | p. 107 |
5.3.10 Distribution SCADA MTU | p. 107 |
5.3.11 Back-Office Computational Platforms | p. 107 |
5.3.12 Traditional Back-Office Applications | p. 108 |
5.4 Definition of Distribution Automation | p. 108 |
5.5 How Does Distribution Automation Work? | p. 114 |
5.6 Distribution System Costs | p. 118 |
5.7 What Is the Smart Grid Function of Distribution Automation? | p. 118 |
5.8 The Importance of the Distribution System and Its Security Challenges | p. 120 |
5.9 Securing the Distribution System | p. 121 |
5.10 Distribution Management Systems | p. 122 |
5.11 Standards, Inoperability, and Cyber Security | p. 123 |
Endnotes | p. 126 |
Chapter 6 Transmission Automation: Can Utilities Work Together Securely? | p. 129 |
6.1 Introduction | p. 129 |
6.2 Transmission Infrastructure Costs | p. 130 |
6.3 Transmission Infrastructure Functionality | p. 131 |
6.4 Transmission Technology | p. 135 |
6.4.1 Energy Management System | p. 138 |
6.4.2 Map Board | p. 138 |
6.4.3 Automatic Generation Control (AGC) | p. 139 |
6.4.4 Supervisory Control | p. 139 |
6.4.5 Contingency Reserve Management | p. 139 |
6.4.6 Interchange Scheduling | p. 140 |
6.4.7 SCADA Master Terminal Unit | p. 141 |
6.4.8 SCADA Front-End Processor | p. 141 |
6.5 Transmission Substations | p. 142 |
6.5.1 Synchrophasors as lEDs | p. 143 |
6.5.2 Relays as lEDs | p. 144 |
6.5.3 Programmable Logic Controllers as lEDs | p. 145 |
6.5.4 RTUs as lEDs | p. 145 |
6.6 Smart Transmission Cyber Security | p. 145 |
6.6.1 Control Center Cyber Security | p. 147 |
6.6.2 Transmission Substation Cyber Security | p. 151 |
6.7 Strategies for Securing the Transmission System | p. 152 |
Endnotes | p. 154 |
Chapter 7 Distributed Generation and Micro-Grids: Can Distributed Systems Work Together? | p. 157 |
7.1 Introduction | p. 157 |
7.2 Major Generation Resources | p. 158 |
7.3 Major Generation Costs | p. 158 |
7.3.1 Nuclear Power | p. 161 |
7.3.2 Coal Power | p. 162 |
7.3.3 Gas Power | p. 163 |
7.3.4 Hydroelectric Generation | p. 163 |
7.3.5 Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) | p. 164 |
7.4 Distributed Energy Resource Costs | p. 165 |
7.4.1 Energy Generation Systems | p. 165 |
7.4.2 Energy Storage Systems | p. 167 |
7.4.3 DER Programs | p. 169 |
7.5 DER Cyber Security | p. 170 |
7.6 Micro-Grids | p. 171 |
7.6.1 Micro-Grid Functions and Smart Grid Interaction | p. 172 |
7.6.2 Cyber Security for Micro-Grids | p. 173 |
7.6.3 Future of Micro-Grids | p. 175 |
7.7 Distributed Control System | p. 175 |
7.8 Smart Grid and Distributed Generation | p. 176 |
7.9 Cyber Security and Distributed Generation | p. 177 |
Endnotes | p. 180 |
Chapter 8 Operations and Outsourcing | p. 185 |
8.1 Introduction | p. 185 |
8.2 Design | p. 186 |
8.3 Engineering | p. 186 |
8.4 Communications | p. 186 |
8.5 Information Technology (IT) | p. 187 |
8.6 Planning | p. 187 |
8.7 Grid Operations | p. 189 |
8.8 Plant Operations | p. 191 |
8.9 Substation Operations | p. 192 |
8.10 Accounting | p. 194 |
8.11 Marketing | p. 194 |
8.12 Maintenance | p. 195 |
8.13 Substation Maintenance | p. 195 |
8.14 Generation Maintenance | p. 196 |
8.15 Construction | p. 197 |
8.16 Metering Support | p. 197 |
8.17 Smart Grid Operations | p. 199 |
8.17.1 Outsourcing | p. 200 |
8.17.2 Cyber Security Incident Response and Outsourcing | p. 202 |
8.17.3 Cyber Security Controls | p. 205 |
Endnotes | p. 206 |
Chapter 9 Plug-In Electric Vehicles and Energy Storage: Now the Fun Really Begins | p. 207 |
9.1 Introduction | p. 207 |
9.2 Storage Technologies | p. 208 |
9.3 Measurement and Coordination | p. 210 |
9.4 What Makes Plug-In Electric Vehicles Unique? | p. 211 |
9.5 Plug-In Vehicle to Grid Logistics | p. 212 |
9.6 Grid to Plug-In Vehicle Logistics | p. 214 |
9.7 Energy Storage and Cyber Security | p. 216 |
9.8 The Future of Energy Storage | p. 218 |
Endnotes | p. 218 |
Chapter 10 What about the Consumer?: Securing Relationships between the Utilities and Their Customers | p. 221 |
10.1 Introduction | p. 221 |
10.2 Electric Charging Stations | p. 221 |
10.3 Home Area Networks | p. 222 |
10.4 Distributed Generation | p. 223 |
10.5 Demand Response and the Consumer | p. 223 |
10.6 Consumer Health Risks of Smart Grid | p. 224 |
10.7 Consumer Protections | p. 224 |
10.8 Utility Protection from the Consumer | p. 226 |
10.9 Third-Party Service Providers | p. 228 |
10.10 Protecting Consumers from Themselves | p. 232 |
Endnotes | p. 233 |
Chapter 11 Identifying and Recovering the Grid from a Cyber-Disaster | p. 235 |
11.1 Introduction | p. 235 |
11.2 Malicious Threats | p. 236 |
11.2.1 Malicious Threats in Control Systems | p. 243 |
11.3 Nonmalicious Threats | p. 246 |
11.4 Incident Identification | p. 248 |
11.5 Incident Containment | p. 248 |
11.6 Incident Eradication | p. 250 |
11.7 Cyber-Disaster | p. 251 |
11.7.1 Load-Shedding Events | p. 253 |
11.7.2 Cyber-Disaster Response | p. 254 |
11.7.3 Cyber-Disaster Recovery | p. 255 |
Endnotes | p. 256 |
Chapter 12 Crystal Ball Time: Will We Have a Secure Grid and What Will It Take? | p. 257 |
12.1 Introduction | p. 257 |
12.2 Smart Meter Security | p. 258 |
12.3 Home Area Networks | p. 259 |
12.4 Head-End and Meter Data Management | p. 259 |
12.5 Distribution System Security | p. 261 |
12.6 Transmission Security and the Bulk Electric System | p. 262 |
12.7 The Distribution System and NERC CIP | p. 263 |
12.8 Identity and Key Management | p. 265 |
12.9 Differential Power Analysis and Other Side Channel Attacks | p. 267 |
12.10 Energy Theft and Market Manipulation | p. 268 |
12.11 Privacy | p. 269 |
12.12 Will the Smart Grid Be Secure? | p. 269 |
Endnotes | p. 271 |
Bibliography | p. 273 |
Index | p. 281 |