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Summary
Summary
The Chief Information Warfare Officer for the entire United States teaches you how to protect your corporate network. This book is a training aid and reference for intrusion detection analysts. While the authors refer to research and theory, they focus their attention on providing practical information. The authors are literally the most recognized names in this specialized field, with unparalleled experience in defending our country's government and military computer networks. New to this edition is coverage of packet dissection, IP datagram fields, forensics, and snort filters.
Author Notes
About the Authors
Stephen Northcutt is a graduate of Mary Washington College. Beforeentering the field of computer security, he worked as a Navy helicopter searchand rescue crewman, white water raft guide, chef, martial arts instructor,cartographer, and network designer. Stephen is author/co-author of IncidentHandling Step by Step, Intrusion Signatures and Analysis, Inside NetworkPerimeter Security, and the previous two editions of this book. He was theoriginal author of the Shadow intrusion detection system and leader of theDepartment of Defense's Shadow Intrusion Detection team before acceptingthe position of Chief for Information Warfare at the Ballistic Missile DefenseOrganization. Stephen currently serves as Director of Training and Certificationfor the SANS Institute.
Judy Novak is currently a senior security analyst working for theBaltimore-based consulting firm of Jacob and Sundstrom, Inc. She primarily worksat the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory where she is involvedin intrusion detection and traffic monitoring and Information Operationsresearch. Judy was one of the founding members of the Army Research LabsComputer Incident Response Team where she worked for three years. She hascontributed to the development of a SANS course in TCP/IP and written a SANShands-on course, "Network Traffic Analysis Using tcpdump," both ofwhich are used in SANS certifications tracks. Judy is a graduate of theUniversity of Maryland--home of the 2002 NCAA basketball champions. She isan aging, yet still passionate, bicyclist, and Lance Armstrong is her modern-dayhero!
© Copyright Pearson Education. All rights reserved.
Excerpts
Excerpts
Introduction Our goal in writing Network Intrusion Detection, Third Edition has been toempower you as an analyst. We believe that if you read this book cover to cover,and put the material into practice as you go, you will be ready to enter theworld of intrusion analysis. Many people have read our books, or attended ourlive class offered by SANS, and the lights have gone on; then, they are off tothe races. We will cover the technical material, the workings of TCP/IP, andalso make every effort to help you understand how an analyst thinks throughdozens of examples. Network Intrusion Detection, Third Edition is offered in five parts. Part I,"TCP/IP," begins with Chapter 1, ranging from an introduction to thefundamental concepts of the Internet protocol to a discussion of RemoteProcedure Calls (RPCs). We realize that it has become stylish to begin a booksaying a few words about TCP/IP, but the system Judy and I have developed hasnot only taught more people IP but a lot more about IP as well--more thanany other system ever developed. We call it "real TCP" because thematerial is based on how packets actually perform on the network, not theory.Even if you are familiar with IP, give the first part of the book a look. We areconfident you will be pleasantly surprised. Perhaps the most important chapterin Part I is Chapter 5, "Stimulus and Response." Whenever you look ata network trace, the first thing you need to determine is if it is a stimulus ora response. This helps you to properly analyze the traffic. Please take the timeto make sure you master this material; it will prevent analysis errors as youmove forward. Tip Whenever you look at a network trace, thefirst thing you need to determine is if it is a stimulus or a response. The book continues in Part II, "Traffic Analysis" with a discussionof traffic analysis. By this, we mean analyzing the network traffic byconsideration of the header fields of the IP and higher protocol fields.Although ASCII and hex signatures are a critical part of intrusion detection,they are only tools in the analyst's tool belt. Also in Part II, we beginto show you the importance of each field, how they are rich treasures tounderstanding. Every field has meaning, and fields provide information bothabout the sender of the packet and its intended purpose. As this part of thebook comes to a close, we tell you stories from the perspective of an analystseeing network patterns for the first time. The goal is to help you prepare forthe day when you will face an unknown pattern. Although there are times a network pattern is so obvious it almost screamsits message, more often you have to search for events of interest. Sometimes,you can do this with a well-known signature, but equally often, you must searchfor it. Whenever attackers write software for denial of service, or exploits,the software tends to leave a signature that is the result of crafting thepacket. This is similar to the way that a bullet bears the marks of the barrelof the gun that fired it, and experts can positively identify the gun by thebullet. In Part III of the book, "Filters/Rules for NetworkMonitoring" we build the skills to examine any field in the packet and theknowledge to determine what is normal and what is anomalous. In this section, wepractice these skills both with TCPdump and also Snort. In Part IV, we consider the larger framework of intrusion detection. Wediscuss where you should place sensors, what a console needs to support for dataanalysis, and automated and manual response issues to intrusion detection. Inaddition, this section helps arm the analyst with information about how theintrusion detection capability fits in with the business model of theorganization. Finally, this book provides three appendixes that reference common signaturesof well-known reconnaissance, denial of service, and exploit scans. We believeyou will find this to be no fluff, packed with data from the first to the lastpage. Network Intrusion Detection, Third Edition has not been developed byprofessional technical writers. Judy and I have been working as analysts since1996 and have faced a number of new patterns. We are thankful for thisopportunity to share our experiences and insights with you and hope this bookwill be of service to you in your journey as an intrusion analyst. (c) Copyright Pearson Education. All rights reserved. Excerpted from Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst's Handbook by Stephen Northcutt, Judy Novak All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.Table of Contents
I TCP/IP | |
1 Ip Concepts | p. 3 |
The TCP/IP Internet Model | p. 4 |
Packaging (Beyond Paper or Plastic) | p. 7 |
Addresses | p. 11 |
Service Ports | p. 15 |
IP Protocols | p. 16 |
Domain Name System | p. 18 |
Routing: How You Get There from Here | p. 19 |
Summary | p. 20 |
2 Introduction to TCPdump and TCP | p. 23 |
TCPdump | p. 24 |
Introduction to TCP | p. 31 |
TCP Gone Awry | p. 38 |
Summary | p. 42 |
3 Fragmentation | p. 43 |
Theory of Fragmentation | p. 44 |
Malicious Fragmentation | p. 53 |
Summary | p. 56 |
4 ICMP | p. 57 |
ICMP Theory | p. 58 |
Mapping Techniques | p. 61 |
Normal ICMP Activity | p. 65 |
Malicious ICMP Activity | p. 69 |
To Block or Not to Block | p. 76 |
Summary | p. 78 |
5 Stimulus and Response | p. 79 |
The Expected | p. 81 |
Protocol Benders | p. 88 |
Abnormal Stimuli | p. 92 |
Summary | p. 101 |
6 DNS | p. 103 |
Back to Basics: DNS Theory | p. 104 |
Using DNS for Reconnaissance | p. 115 |
Tainting DNS Responses | p. 119 |
Summary | p. 122 |
II Traffic Analysis | |
7 Packet Dissection Using TCPdump | p. 125 |
Why Learn to Do Packet Dissection? | p. 127 |
Sidestep DNS Queries | p. 129 |
Introduction to Packet Dissection Using TCPdump | p. 131 |
Where Does the IP Stop and the Embedded Protocol Begin? | p. 133 |
Other Length Fields | p. 133 |
Increasing the Snaplen | p. 135 |
Dissecting the Whole Packet | p. 137 |
Freeware Tools for Packet Dissection | p. 139 |
Summary | p. 142 |
8 Examining IP Header Fields | p. 143 |
Insertion and Evasion Attacks | p. 143 |
IP Header Fields | p. 147 |
The More Fragments (MF) Flag | p. 151 |
Summary | p. 159 |
9 Examining Embedded Protocol Header Fields | p. 161 |
TCP | p. 161 |
UDP | p. 178 |
ICMP | p. 181 |
Summary | p. 183 |
10 Real-World Analysis | p. 185 |
You've Been Hacked! | p. 186 |
Netbus Scan | p. 189 |
How Slow Can you Go? | p. 194 |
RingZero Worm | p. 197 |
Summary | p. 200 |
11 Mystery Traffic | p. 203 |
The Event in a Nutshell | p. 204 |
The Traffic | p. 204 |
DDoS or Scan | p. 205 |
Fingerprinting Participant Hosts | p. 210 |
Summary | p. 218 |
III Filters/Rules for Network Monitoring | |
12 Writing TCPdump Filters | p. 221 |
The Mechanics of Writing TCPdump Filters | p. 222 |
Bit Masking | p. 224 |
TCPdump IP Filters | p. 227 |
TCPdump UDP Filters | p. 229 |
TCPdump TCP Filters | p. 231 |
Summary | p. 236 |
13 Introduction to Snort and Snort Rules | p. 237 |
An Overview of Running Snort | p. 238 |
Snort Rules | p. 240 |
Summary | p. 248 |
14 Snort Rules--Part II | p. 249 |
Format of Snort Options | p. 250 |
Rule Options | p. 250 |
Putting It All Together | p. 266 |
Summary | p. 269 |
IV Intrusion Infrastructure | |
15 Mitnick Attack | p. 273 |
Exploiting TCP | p. 274 |
Detecting the Mitnick Attack | p. 285 |
Network-Based Intrusion-Detection Systems | p. 286 |
Host-Based Intrusion-Detection Systems | p. 288 |
Preventing the Mitnick Attack | p. 289 |
Summary | p. 290 |
16 Architectural Issues | p. 291 |
Events of Interest | p. 292 |
Limits to Observation | p. 294 |
Low-Hanging Fruit Paradigm | p. 296 |
Human Factors Limit Detects | p. 298 |
Severity | p. 300 |
Countermeasures | p. 303 |
Calculating Severity | p. 304 |
Sensor Placement | p. 307 |
Outside Firewall | p. 308 |
Push/Pull | p. 311 |
Analyst Console | p. 312 |
Host- or Network-Based Intrusion Detection | p. 316 |
Summary | p. 318 |
17 Organizational Issues | p. 319 |
Organizational Security Model | p. 320 |
Defining Risk | p. 324 |
Risk | p. 326 |
Defining the Threat | p. 332 |
Risk Management Is Dollar Driven | p. 336 |
How Risky Is a Risk? | p. 336 |
Summary | p. 338 |
18 Automated and Manual Response | p. 339 |
Automated Response | p. 341 |
Honeypot | p. 347 |
Manual Response | p. 349 |
Summary | p. 358 |
19 Business Case for Intrusion Detection | p. 359 |
Part 1 Management Issues | p. 361 |
Part 2 Threats and Vulnerabilities | p. 367 |
Part 3 Tradeoffs and Recommended Solution | p. 372 |
Repeat the Executive Summary | p. 377 |
Summary | p. 378 |
20 Future Directions | p. 379 |
Increasing Threat | p. 379 |
Defending Against the Threat | p. 383 |
Defense in Depth | p. 388 |
Emerging Techniques | p. 392 |
Summary | p. 396 |
V Appendixes | |
A Exploits and Scans to Apply Exploits | p. 401 |
False Positives | p. 401 |
IMAP Exploits | p. 409 |
Scans to Apply Exploits | p. 413 |
Single Exploit, Portmap | p. 417 |
Summary | p. 423 |
B Denial of Service | p. 425 |
Brute-Force Denial-of-Service Traces | p. 426 |
Elegant Kills | p. 430 |
nmap | p. 433 |
Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks | p. 435 |
Summary | p. 438 |
Ctection of Intelligence Gathering | p. 439 |
Network and Host Mapping | p. 440 |
NetBIOS-Specific Traces | p. 450 |
Stealth Attacks | p. 452 |
Measuring Response Time | p. 457 |
Worms as Information Gatherers | p. 460 |
Summary | p. 464 |
Index | p. 465 |