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Library | Item Barcode | Call Number | Material Type | Item Category 1 | Status |
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Searching... | 30000010334984 | QA269 O93 2013 | Open Access Book | Book | Searching... |
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Summary
Summary
Game Theory has served as a standard text for game theory courses since the publication of the First Edition in 1968. The Fourth Edition updates several recently developed subfields. It adds fresh chapters on subjects such as games with incomplete information and spatial games. Owen has expanded "Two-Person General-Sum Games" into two chapters, the second becoming "Two-Person Cooperative Games." There are new sections in the chapters "Two-Person Cooperative Games" and "Indices of Power," and there is new information throughout the book on non-cooperative games. "Game Theory" remains the only book to cover all salient aspects of this field that, having displaced Keynesian economics, is making inroads throughout the social sciences. The key features are: it explains work of 1994 Nobel Prize Winners; it provides full expansion of cooperative game theory sections; it covers games with incomplete information; it includes a spatial games section that features many illustrations; and, it includes an updated bibliography.
Table of Contents
Preface | p. ix |
1 Definition of a Game | p. 1 |
1.1 General Notions | p. 1 |
1.2 Games in Extensive Form | p. 1 |
1.3 Strategies: The Normal Form | p. 4 |
1.4 Equilibrium n-Tuples | p. 5 |
1.5 The Monty Hall Game | p. 7 |
Problems | p. 9 |
2 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games | p. 13 |
2.1 Zero-Sum Games | p. 13 |
2.2 The Normal Form | p. 14 |
2.3 Mixed Strategies | p. 15 |
2.4 The Minimax Theorem | p. 17 |
2.5 Computation of Optimal Strategies | p. 24 |
2.6 Symmetric Games | p. 30 |
Problems | p. 31 |
3 Linear Programming | p. 35 |
3.1 Introduction | p. 35 |
3.2 Duality | p. 36 |
3.3 Solution of Linear Programs | p. 42 |
3.4 The Simplex Algorithm | p. 43 |
3.5 The Simplex Algorithm (Continued) | p. 48 |
3.6 Examples | p. 52 |
3.7 Constrained Games | p. 57 |
Problems | p. 59 |
4 Infinite Games | p. 63 |
4.1 Games with Countably many Strategies | p. 63 |
4.2 Games on the Square | p. 65 |
4.3 Games with Continuous Kernel | p. 66 |
4.4 Concave-Convex Games | p. 69 |
4.5 Games of Timing | p. 71 |
4.6 Higher Dimensions | p. 76 |
Problems | p. 82 |
5 Multistage Games | p. 87 |
5.1 Behavioral Strategies | p. 87 |
5.2 Games of Exhaustion | p. 88 |
5.3 Stochastic Games | p. 92 |
5.4 Recursive Games | p. 98 |
5.5 Differential Games | p. 100 |
Problems | p. 113 |
6 Games with Incomplete Information | p. 117 |
6.1 Introduction: The One-Stage Signaling Model | p. 117 |
6.2 The Multistage Model | p. 125 |
Problems | p. 144 |
7 Utility Theory | p. 147 |
7.1 Ordinal Utility | p. 147 |
7.2 Lotteries | p. 148 |
7.3 Commodity Bundles | p. 153 |
7.4 Absolute Utility | p. 154 |
Problems | p. 156 |
8 Two-Person General-Sum Games | p. 159 |
8.1 Bimatrix Games (Noncooperative) | p. 159 |
8.2 Perfect Equilibrium Points | p. 162 |
8.3 Evolutionary Stable Systems | p. 169 |
8.4 Correlated Equilibria | p. 178 |
Problems | p. 183 |
9 Two-Person Cooperative Games | p. 187 |
9.1 The Bargaining Problem | p. 187 |
9.2 Threats | p. 194 |
9.3 Time-Restricted Bargaining | p. 198 |
Problems | p. 205 |
10 n-Person Games | p. 207 |
10.1 Noncooperative Games | p. 207 |
10.2 Cooperative Games | p. 207 |
10.3 Domination, Strategic Equivalence, and Normalization | p. 210 |
10.4 The Core | p. 213 |
10.5 Balanced Collections | p. 219 |
Problems | p. 227 |
11 Stable Sets | p. 229 |
11.1 Introduction | p. 229 |
11.2 Properties of Stable Sets | p. 235 |
11.3 Edgeworth Market Games-An Example | p. 243 |
11.4 A Game with No Solutions | p. 247 |
Problems | p. 252 |
12 Indices of Power | p. 255 |
12.1 The Shapley Value | p. 255 |
12.2 Multilinear Extensions | p. 260 |
12.3 The Banzhaf-Coleman Index of Power | p. 273 |
12.4 The Presidential Election "Game" | p. 286 |
12.5 The Coalition Value | p. 294 |
Problems | p. 303 |
13 The Bargaining Set and Related Concepts | p. 305 |
13.1 The Bargaining Set | p. 305 |
13.2 The Kernel | p. 310 |
13.3 The Nucleolus | p. 312 |
13.4 The Airport Game | p. 324 |
Problems | p. 331 |
14 Nonatomic Games | p. 333 |
14.1 Games with a Continuum of Players | p. 333 |
14.2 Values of Nonatomic Games | p. 336 |
14.3 Internal Telephone Billing Rates - An Example | p. 350 |
Problems | p. 352 |
15 Games without Side Payments | p. 355 |
15.1 Introduction | p. 355 |
15.2 The Core | p. 360 |
15.3 Market Games | p. 375 |
15.4 Approaches to the Value | p. 383 |
15.5 The Bargaining Sets | p. 388 |
Problems | p. 392 |
16 Spatial Games | p. 395 |
16.1 The Core and Near-Core Solution Concepts | p. 395 |
16.2 The Modified Power Index | p. 402 |
Problems | p. 411 |
17 Other Applications | p. 413 |
17.1 Introduction | p. 413 |
17.2 Single-Item Auctions | p. 413 |
17.3 Mechanisms | p. 417 |
17.4 Public Goods | p. 421 |
17.5 Two-sided Matching | p. 424 |
Problems | p. 429 |
Appendix | |
A.1 Convexity | p. 433 |
A.2 Fixed Point Theorems | p. 436 |
Bibliography | p. 437 |
Index | p. 447 |