Group formation in economics : networks, clubs and coalitions

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Cambridge, UK : Cambridge Univ Pr., 2005

ISBN:

9780521842716

Subject Term:

Social networks -- Economic aspects

Social groups -- Economic aspects

Game theory

Added Author:

Demange, Gabrielle

Wooders, Myrna Holtz

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Library	Item Barcode	Call Number	Material Type	Item Category 1	Status
Searching... PSZ JB	30000010141886	HM741 G76 2005	Open Access Book	Book	Searching... Unknown

Broad and diverse ranges of activities are conducted within and by organized groups of individuals, including political, economic and social activities. These activities have become a subject of intense interest in economics and game theory. Some of the topics investigated in this collection are models of networks of power and privilege, trade networks, co-authorship networks, buyer-seller networks with differentiated products, and networks of medical innovation and the adaptation of new information. Other topics are social norms on punctuality, clubs and the provision of club goods and public goods, research and development and collusive alliances among corporations, and international alliances and trading agreements. While relatively recent, the literature on game theoretic studies of group formation in economics is already vast. This volume provides an introduction to this important literature on game-theoretic treatments of situations with networks, clubs, and coalitions, including some applications.

Matthew O. JacksonAnne van den NouwelandFrank H. Page, Jr. and Samir KamatSanjeev GoyalGabrielle DemangeAlexander Kovalenkov and Myrna WoodersJohn Conley and Stefani SmithMichel Le Breton and Shlomo WeberAmrita DhillonMika WidgrenFrancis BlochCarlo CarraroFernando Jaramillo and Hubert Kempf and Fabien MoizeauGarance Genicot and Debraj RayMarcel Fafchamps

List of Contributors	p. ix
Introduction	p. 1
Part 1 Network Formation, Communication, and Learning
1 A Survey of Network Formation Models: Stability and Efficiency	p. 11
1.1 Introduction	p. 11
1.2 Defining Network Games	p. 13
1.3 Some Examples	p. 19
1.4 Modeling Network Formation	p. 25
1.5 The Relationship between Stability and Efficiency	p. 36
1.6 The Myerson Value and Alternative Allocation Rules	p. 45
1.7 Concluding Discussion	p. 49
2 Models of Network Formation in Cooperative Games	p. 58
2.1 Introduction	p. 58
2.2 Definitions	p. 60
2.3 Network-Formation Game in Extensive Form	p. 63
2.4 Network-Formation Game in Strategic Form	p. 68
2.5 Comparison of the Network-Formation Models in Extensive and Strategic Forms	p. 73
2.6 Network Formation with Costs for Establishing Links	p. 73
2.7 Simultaneous Bargaining over Network Formation and Payoff Division	p. 79
2.8 Related Literature	p. 85
3 Farsighted Stability in Network Formation	p. 89
3.1 Introduction	p. 89
3.2 Directed Networks	p. 93
3.3 Supernetworks	p. 95
3.4 Notions of Farsighted Stability in Network Formation	p. 101
3.5 Computational Examples: Strategic Information Sharing	p. 109
4 Learning in Networks	p. 122
4.1 Introduction	p. 122
4.2 Networks	p. 125
4.3 Nonstrategic Interaction	p. 127
4.4 Strategic Interaction	p. 137
4.5 Evolving Networks	p. 149
4.6 Optimal Links and Actions in Games	p. 156
4.7 Concluding Remarks	p. 162
Part 2 On Equilibrium Formation of Groups: A Theoretical Assessment
5 Group Formation: The Interaction of Increasing Returns and Preferences Diversity	p. 171
5.1 Introduction	p. 171
5.2 Competition under Increasing Returns	p. 173
5.3 On Competition across Groups	p. 186
5.4 Public Decision Rules and Mobility	p. 198
5.5 Conclusion	p. 205
6 Games and Economies with Near Exhaustion of Gains to Scale	p. 209
6.1 Games with Many Players as Models of Large Economies	p. 209
6.2 Games with Side Payments	p. 212
6.3 Parameterized Collections of Games	p. 215
6.4 Pregames	p. 216
6.5 Nonemptiness of Approximate Cores of Games in Parameterized Collections	p. 220
6.6 Examples of Coalition Production Economies with Small or Large Optimal Firms	p. 223
6.7 Equal Treatment of Similar Individuals	p. 224
6.8 Games and Markets	p. 226
6.9 Examples of Local Public Goods Economies	p. 230
6.10 Attribute Games and Exchange Economies	p. 233
6.11 Some Relationships to the Literature	p. 235
6.12 Conclusions	p. 239
7 Coalitions and Clubs: Tiebout Equilibrium in Large Economies	p. 246
7.1 Introduction	p. 246
7.2 Agents and Crowding	p. 248
7.3 A Local Public Goods Economy	p. 254
7.4 Optimality and Decentralization	p. 256
7.5 Existence	p. 258
7.6 Noncooperative Solutions	p. 259
7.7 Other Results and Future Research	p. 260
8 Secession-Proof Cost Allocations and Stable Group Structures in Models of Horizontal Differentiation	p. 266
8.1 Introduction	p. 266
8.2 The Model	p. 268
8.3 Cooperative Framework	p. 269
8.4 Unrestricted Cost-Allocation Correspondence	p. 271
8.5 Restricted Cost-Allocation Correspondence	p. 276
Part 3 Groups, Clubs, Alliances in Political and Economic Environments
9 Political Parties and Coalition Formation	p. 289
9.1 Introduction	p. 289
9.2 Preelectoral Coalitions	p. 290
9.3 Postelection Coalitions	p. 298
9.4 Conclusions	p. 302
10 Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules	p. 312
10.1 Introduction	p. 312
10.2 Measuring Power	p. 313
10.3 Applying Power Indices to the EU	p. 319
10.4 Power in EU Procedures	p. 322
10.5 Concluding Remarks	p. 331
11 Group and Network Formation in Industrial Organization: A Survey	p. 335
11.1 Introduction	p. 335
11.2 Group and Network Stability	p. 336
11.3 Cartels and Collusive Networks	p. 338
11.4 Alliances and Networks of Collaboration	p. 345
11.5 Trade Networks	p. 348
12 Institution Design for Managing Global Commons: Lessons from Coalition Theory	p. 354
12.1 Introduction	p. 354
12.2 Accession Rules and Equilibrium Environmental Coalitions	p. 357
12.3 Endogenous Minimum Participation Rules in International Environmental Agreements	p. 360
12.4 Endogenous Issue Linkage in International Negotiations	p. 366
12.5 Regional versus Global Environmental Treaties	p. 370
12.6 Conclusions	p. 377
13 Inequality and Growth Clubs	p. 381
13.1 Introduction	p. 381
13.2 Stratification and Growth: Evidence	p. 384
13.3 Stratification and Growth: Theoretical Approaches	p. 388
13.4 Inequality, Stratification, and Growth	p. 398
13.5 Club Formation Dynamics and Growth	p. 412
13.6 Conclusion	p. 418
14 Informal Insurance, Enforcement Constraints, and Group Formation	p. 430
14.1 Introduction	p. 430
14.2 Group Formation under Equal Sharing	p. 433
14.3 Stationary Transfers	p. 435
14.4 General Results: Asymmetric Treatment and History Dependence	p. 440
14.5 Some Final Remarks	p. 443
15 Spontaneous Market Emergence and Social Networks	p. 447
15.1 Introduction	p. 447
15.2 A Model of Relational Contracting	p. 449
15.3 Stigmatization and Collective Punishment	p. 460
15.4 Networks and Markets	p. 463
15.5 Conclusion	p. 466
Index	p. 471

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