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Library | Item Barcode | Call Number | Material Type | Item Category 1 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Searching... | 30000010117714 | JQ1631 .C65 2003 | Open Access Book | Book | Searching... |
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Summary
Summary
The widespread migration of civil servants to high-profile positions in the private and public sectors is known in Japan as amakudari, or "descent from heaven." Recent media stories associate the practice with corruption as the former officials seek government favors for their new employers. In their timely book, Richard A. Colignon and Chikako Usui offer the first systematic exploration of this influential yet poorly understood Japanese institution.Colignon and Usui analyze amakudari as a ministry-level phenomenon that is consciously constructed and reproduced with intricate networks in many political and corporate spheres. Drawing on five decades of qualitative and quantitative data delineating the post-retirement careers of leading bureaucrats, they examine changes in traditional job patterns. Although not as strong a force as in the 1960s and 1970s, amakudari, in their view, remains a critical feature of Japanese society and heavily shapes the relationship between government and business.The authors warn that despite the Japanese media criticism of amakudari, it comprises a power structure resistant to radical change. Most important, their book demonstrates that a gradual weakening of this practice may not lead to a more democratic, meritocratic society.
Author Notes
Richard A. Colignon is Professor in the Department of Sociology and The Center for Social and Public Policy, Duquesne University. He is the author of Power Plays: Critical Events in the Institutionalization of the Tennessee Valley Authority . Chikako Usui is Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Graduate Program in Gerontology, and Center for International Studies, University of Missouri-St. Louis.
Reviews 1
Choice Review
This volume presents a study of a set of Japanese practices collectively known as amakudari, or "descent from heaven," where high-level bureaucrats move from government ministries to top positions in public and private corporations as well as national politics. Colignon (Duquesne Univ.) and Usui (Univ. of Missouri-St. Louis) identify and analyze four distinct paths of amakudari, which they see as part of larger networks consisting of specific ministries and a specific elite group, graduates of the University of Tokyo. They contend that despite legislative attempts to restrict amakudari and the fact that the number of bureaucrats who annually "descend" is small, approximately 1,700 individuals, it is a key institution in postwar Japan. It creates an alignment of interests among government, bureaucracy, and business that gives the Japanese economy a unique internal coherence, and because it produces results it has been tolerated by the public. In the last ten years, amakudari has become the chief obstacle to reform in Japan, and its legitimacy has been undermined by glaring government corruption and the gross mismanagement of the economy. This extremely interesting work reveals important hidden networks of influence in the Japanese political economy and contributes to further revealing the cultural specificity of Japanese capitalism. ^BSumming Up: Highly recommended. Graduate and research collections. C. H. A. Dassbach Michigan Technological University
