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Cover image for Access control, security, and trust : a logical approach
Title:
Access control, security, and trust : a logical approach
Personal Author:
Series:
Chapman & Hall/CRC cryptography and network security
Publication Information:
Boca Raton : Chapman & Hall/CRC, c2011
Physical Description:
xxi, 322 p. : ill. ; 25 cm.
ISBN:
9781584888628
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Material Type
Item Category 1
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30000010267217 QA76.9.A25 C45 2011 Open Access Book Book
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Summary

Summary

Developed from the authors' courses at Syracuse University and the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory, Access Control, Security, and Trust: A Logical Approach equips readers with an access control logic they can use to specify and verify their security designs. Throughout the text, the authors use a single access control logic based on a simple propositional modal logic.

The first part of the book presents the syntax and semantics of access control logic, basic access control concepts, and an introduction to confidentiality and integrity policies. The second section covers access control in networks, delegation, protocols, and the use of cryptography. In the third section, the authors focus on hardware and virtual machines. The final part discusses confidentiality, integrity, and role-based access control.

Taking a logical, rigorous approach to access control, this book shows how logic is a useful tool for analyzing security designs and spelling out the conditions upon which access control decisions depend. It is designed for computer engineers and computer scientists who are responsible for designing, implementing, and verifying secure computer and information systems.


Author Notes

Shiu-Kai Chin is a Meredith Professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at Syracuse University. He is also director of the Center for Information and Systems Assurance and Trust. While at Syracuse, Dr. Chin has received the Outstanding Teacher Award, the Chancellor's Citation for Outstanding Contributions to the University's Academic Programs, and the Crouse Hinds Award for Excellence in Education.

Susan Older is an associate professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at Syracuse University. She is also the program director for the Certificate of Advanced Study in Systems Assurance. Dr. Older's research interests include programming-language semantics, logics of programs, formal methods, and information-assurance and computer science education.


Table of Contents

List of Tablesp. xiii
List of Figuresp. xv
Prefacep. xix
1 Access Control, Security, Trust, and Logicp. 1
1.1 Deconstructing Access-Control Decisionsp. 3
1.2 A Logical Approach to Access Controlp. 6
I Preliminariesp. 9
2 A Language for Access Controlp. 11
2.1 Sets and Relationsp. 11
2.1.1 Notationp. 12
2.1.2 Approaches for Mathematical Proofsp. 13
2.2 Syntaxp. 15
2.2.1 Principal Expressionsp. 17
2.2.2 Access-Control Statementsp. 18
2.2.3 Well-Formed Formulasp. 20
2.3 Semanticsp. 22
2.3.1 Kripke Structuresp. 23
2.3.2 Semantics of the Logicp. 28
2.4 Summaryp. 37
2.5 Further Readingp. 37
3 Reasoning about Access Controlp. 39
3.1 Logical Rulesp. 39
3.1.1 The Taut Rulep. 41
3.1.2 The Modus Ponens Rulep. 42
3.1.3 The Says Rulep. 42
3.1.4 The MP Says Rulep. 42
3.1.5 The Speaks For Rulep. 43
3.1.6 The & Says and Quoting Rulesp. 43
3.1.7 Properties of →p. 43
3.1.8 The Equivalence Rulep. 45
3.1.9 The Controls Definitionp. 46
3.2 Formal Proofs and Theoremsp. 47
3.3 Soundness of Logical Rulesp. 50
3.4 Summaryp. 54
3.5 Further Readingp. 54
4 Basic Conceptsp. 57
4.1 Reference Monitorsp. 57
4.2 Access-Control Mechanisms: Tickets and Listsp. 60
4.2.1 Ticketsp. 61
4.2.2 Listsp. 63
4.2.3 Logical and Pragmatic Implicationsp. 66
4.3 Authenticationp. 68
4.3.1 Two-Factor Authenticationp. 68
4.3.2 Using Credentials from Other Authoritiesp. 70
4.3.3 Groupsp. 74
4.4 Summaryp. 75
4.5 Further Readingp. 76
5 Security Policiesp. 77
5.1 Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availabilityp. 77
5.2 Discretionary Security Policiesp. 79
5.3 Mandatory Security Policiesp. 81
5.4 Military Security Policiesp. 85
5.4.1 Extending the Logic with Security levelsp. 85
5.4.2 Expressing Military Security Policiesp. 87
5.4.3 Military Security Policies: An Extended Examplep. 90
5.5 Commercial Policiesp. 94
5.5.1 Extending the Logic with Integrity Levelsp. 95
5.5.2 Protecting Integrityp. 97
5.5.3 Strict Integrityp. 98
5.5.4 An Extended Example of a Strict Integrity Policyp. 100
5.6 Summaryp. 105
5.7 Further Readingp. 105
II Distributed Access Controlp. 107
6 Digital Authenticationp. 109
6.1 Public-Key Cryptographyp. 109
6.2 Efficiency Mechanismsp. 112
6.2.1 Cryptographic Hash Functionsp. 112
6.2.2 Data-Encryption Keysp. 113
6.2.3 Digital Signaturesp. 113
6.3 Reasoning about Cryptographic Communicationsp. 114
6.4 Certificates, Certificate Authorities, and Trustp. 116
6.5 Symmetric-Key Cryptographyp. 125
6.6 Summaryp. 131
6.7 Further Readingp. 131
7 Delegationp. 133
7.1 Simple Delegationsp. 133
7.2 Delegation and Its Propertiesp. 135
7.3 A Delegation Example: Simple Checkingp. 141
7.3.1 Formal Definitions of Checksp. 142
7.3.2 Bank Policies on Checksp. 143
7.3.3 Operating Rules for Checksp. 144
7.4 Summaryp. 147
7.5 Further Readingp. 147
8 Networks: Case Studiesp. 149
8.1 SSL and TLS: Authentication across the Webp. 149
8.1.1 Handshake Protocolp. 150
8.1.2 Record Protocolp. 155
8.2 Kerberos: Authentication for Distributed Systemsp. 157
8.2.1 Initial Authentication Requestsp. 157
8.2.2 Requests for Service-Specific Ticketsp. 159
8.2.3 Requests for Servicesp. 161
8.2.4 Proxiable Ticketsp. 162
8.3 Financial Networksp. 166
8.3.1 Electronic Clearinghousesp. 166
8.3.2 Bank Authorities, Jurisdiction, and Policiesp. 169
8.3.3 Bank Operating Rulesp. 170
8.4 Summaryp. 172
8.5 Further Readingp. 173
III Isolation and Sharingp. 175
9 A Primer on Computer Hardwarep. 177
9.1 Ones and Zerosp. 177
9.2 Synchronous Designp. 178
9.2.1 Synchronous Registersp. 178
9.2.2 Registers with Load Controlp. 179
9.2.3 Registers with Tri-State Outputsp. 179
9.2.4 Combinational Logic and Functionsp. 182
9.2.5 Arithmetic Logic Unitsp. 184
9.3 Microcodep. 190
9.3.1 Data Paths and Control Pathsp. 190
9.3.2 Microprogrammingp. 192
9.4 Summaryp. 193
9.5 Further Readingp. 195
10 Virtual Machines and Memory Protectionp. 197
10.1 A Simple Processorp. 198
10.1.1 Processor Componentsp. 199
10.1.2 Machine Instructionsp. 201
10.2 Processors with Memory Segmentationp. 204
10.2.1 Segmentation Using a Relocation Registerp. 204
10.2.2 Processor State and Instructionsp. 207
10.2.3 Program Status Wordp. 207
10.2.4 Trapsp. 208
10.3 Controlling Access to Memory and Segmentation Registersp. 209
10.3.1 Access to Program Memoryp. 210
10.3.2 Implementation Detailsp. 212
10.3.3 Access to the Relocation Registerp. 213
10.3.4 Setting the Mode Bitp. 215
10.4 Design of the Virtual Machine Monitorp. 217
10.4.1 Privileged Instructionsp. 220
10.4.2 Sensitive Instructionsp. 221
10.4.3 Virtualizable Processor Architecturesp. 223
10.5 Summaryp. 224
10.6 Further Readingp. 225
11 Access Control Using Descriptors and Capabilitiesp. 227
11.1 Address Descriptors and Capabilitiesp. 227
11.2 Tagged Architecturesp. 231
11.3 Capability Systemsp. 233
11.3.1 Catalogsp. 233
11.3.2 Creating New Segmentsp. 235
11.3.3 Dynamic Sharingp. 237
11.3.4 Revocation of Capabilitiesp. 239
11.4 Summaryp. 241
11.5 Further Readingp. 242
12 Access Control Using Lists and Ringsp. 245
12.1 Generalized Addressesp. 245
12.2 Segment Access Controllersp. 247
12.3 ACL-Based Access Policy for Memory Accessesp. 249
12.4 Ring-Based Access Controlp. 253
12.4.1 Access Bracketsp. 254
12.4.2 Call Bracketsp. 255
12.5 Summaryp. 258
12.6 Further Readingp. 259
IV Access Policiesp. 261
13 Confidentiality and Integrity Policiesp. 263
13.1 Classifications and Categoriesp. 263
13.2 Bell-La Padula Model, Revisitedp. 266
13.3 Confidentiality levels: Some Practical Considerationsp. 269
13.4 Biba's Strict Integrity, Revisitedp. 272
13.5 Lipner's Integrity Modelp. 276
13.5.1 Commercial Integrity Requirementsp. 277
13.5.2 Commercial Integrity via Bell-La Padulap. 277
13.5.3 Commercial Integrity via Bell-La Padula and Strict Integrityp. 281
13.6 Summaryp. 285
13.7 Further Readingp. 285
14 Role-Based Access Controlp. 289
14.1 RBAC Fundamentalsp. 289
14.1.1 Role Inheritancep. 290
14.1.2 Sessionsp. 295
14.2 Separation of Dutyp. 297
14.2.1 Static Separation of Dutyp. 297
14.2.2 Dynamic Separation of Dutyp. 299
14.3 Representing RBAC Systems in the Logicp. 304
14.3.1 RBAC Extensions to the Logicp. 304
14.3.2 Translating RBAC into the Logicp. 305
14.4 Summaryp. 310
14.5 Further Readingp. 312
A Summary of the Access-Control Logicp. 313
A.1 Syntaxp. 313
A.2 Core Rules, Derived Rules, and Extensionsp. 315
Bibliographyp. 321
Notation Indexp. 324
General Indexp. 325
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