Role-based access control

Library	Item Barcode	Call Number	Material Type	Item Category 1	Status
Searching... PSZ JB	30000010020202	QA76.9.A25 F47 2003	Open Access Book	Book	Searching... Unknown
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Securing networked and Web-based systems can be costly because these open and easy-to-access systems leave a myriad of unwanted openings for hackers and other intruders to break into. Role-based access control (RBAC) is a security mechanism that can greatly lower the cost and complexity of securing large networked and Web-based systems. This volume covers the basic components of RBAC as well as deploying, supporting and administering RBAC.

Author Notes

David Ferraiolo is a supervisory computer scientist in the Systems and Networks Security Group at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Gaithersburg, MD. In addition to managing three access control and security management projects, he is leading research to improve operational assurance, security authentication, intrusion detection, and authorization.

050

Preface	p. xv
Acknowledgments	p. xvii
1 Introduction	p. 1
1.1 The purpose and fundamentals of access control	p. 2
1.1.1 Authorization versus authentication	p. 3
1.1.2 Users, subjects, objects, operations, and permissions	p. 4
1.1.3 Least privilege	p. 5
1.2 A brief history of access control	p. 6
1.2.1 Access control in the mainframe era	p. 6
1.2.2 Department of Defense standards	p. 8
1.2.3 Clark-Wilson model	p. 9
1.2.4 Origins of RBAC	p. 9
1.3 Comparing RBAC to DAC and MAC	p. 16
1.4 RBAC and the enterprise	p. 18
1.4.1 Economics of RBAC	p. 18
1.4.2 Authorization management and resource provisioning	p. 20
References	p. 23
2 Access Control Policy, Models, and Mechanisms--Concepts and Examples	p. 27
2.1 Policy, models, and mechanisms	p. 27
2.2 Subjects and objects	p. 30
2.3 Reference monitor and security kernel	p. 31
2.3.1 Completeness	p. 33
2.3.2 Isolation	p. 33
2.3.3 Verifiability	p. 34
2.3.4 The reference monitor--necessary, but not sufficient	p. 35
2.4 DAC policies	p. 35
2.5 Access control matrix	p. 36
2.5.1 ACLs and capability lists	p. 37
2.5.2 Protection bits	p. 38
2.6 MAC policies and models	p. 39
2.7 Biba's integrity model	p. 41
2.8 Clark-Wilson model	p. 42
2.9 The Chinese wall policy	p. 44
2.10 The Brewer-Nash model	p. 45
2.11 Domain-type enforcement model	p. 46
References	p. 48
3 Core RBAC Features	p. 51
3.1 Roles versus ACL groups	p. 53
3.2 Core RBAC	p. 55
3.2.1 Administrative support	p. 55
3.2.2 Permissions	p. 56
3.2.3 Role activation	p. 58
3.3 Mapping the enterprise view to the system view	p. 59
3.3.1 Global users and roles and indirect role privileges	p. 62
3.3.2 Mapping permissions into privileges	p. 63
4 Role Hierarchies	p. 67
4.1 Building role hierarchies from flat roles	p. 68
4.2 Inheritance schemes	p. 69
4.2.1 Direct privilege inheritance	p. 69
4.2.2 Permission and user membership inheritance	p. 70
4.2.3 User containment and indirect privilege inheritance	p. 72
4.3 Hierarchy structures and inheritance forms	p. 75
4.3.1 Connector roles	p. 76
4.3.2 Organization chart hierarchies	p. 79
4.3.3 Geographical regions	p. 81
4.4 Accounting for role types	p. 83
4.5 General and limited role hierarchies	p. 84
4.6 Accounting for the Stanford model	p. 87
References	p. 89
5 SoD and Constraints in RBAC Systems	p. 91
5.1 Types of SoD	p. 94
5.1.1 Static SoD	p. 94
5.1.2 Dynamic SoD	p. 98
5.1.3 Operational SoD	p. 99
5.1.4 History and object-based SoD	p. 100
5.2 Using SoD in real systems	p. 101
5.2.1 SoD in role hierarchies	p. 102
5.2.2 Static and dynamic constraints	p. 103
5.2.3 Mutual exclusion	p. 104
5.2.4 Effects of privilege assignment	p. 105
5.2.5 Assigning privileges to roles	p. 107
5.2.6 Assigning roles to users	p. 108
5.3 Temporal constraints in RBAC	p. 112
5.3.1 Need for temporal constraints	p. 112
5.3.2 Taxonomy of temporal constraints	p. 113
5.3.3 Associated requirements for supporting temporal constraints	p. 116
References	p. 117
6 RBAC, MAC, and DAC	p. 121
6.1 Enforcing DAC using RBAC	p. 122
6.1.1 Configuring RBAC for DAC	p. 123
6.1.2 DAC with grant-independent revocation	p. 124
6.1.3 Additional considerations for grant-dependent revocation	p. 125
6.2 Enforcing MAC on RBAC systems	p. 125
6.2.1 Configuring RBAC for MAC using static constraints	p. 126
6.2.2 Configuring RBAC for MAC using dynamic constraints	p. 127
6.3 Implementing RBAC on MLS systems	p. 130
6.3.1 Roles and privilege sets	p. 132
6.3.2 Assignment of categories to privilege sets	p. 133
6.3.3 Assignment of categories to roles	p. 134
6.3.4 Example of MLS to RBAC mapping	p. 134
6.4 Running RBAC and MAC simultaneously	p. 136
References	p. 138
7 NIST's Proposed RBAC Standard	p. 141
7.1 Overview	p. 141
7.2 Functional specification packages	p. 142
7.3 The RBAC reference model	p. 144
7.4 Functional specification overview	p. 145
7.5 Functional specification for core RBAC	p. 146
7.5.1 Administrative functions	p. 146
7.5.2 Supporting system functions	p. 146
7.5.3 Review functions	p. 147
7.6 Functional specification for hierarchical RBAC	p. 147
7.6.1 Hierarchical administrative functions	p. 147
7.6.2 Supporting system functions	p. 149
7.6.3 Review functions	p. 149
7.7 Functional specification for SSD relation	p. 150
7.7.1 Administrative functions	p. 150
7.7.2 Supporting system functions	p. 151
7.7.3 Review functions	p. 151
7.8 Functional specification for a DSD relation	p. 152
7.8.1 Administrative functions	p. 152
7.8.2 Supporting system functions	p. 152
7.8.3 Review functions	p. 153
Reference	p. 153
8 Role-Based Administration of RBAC	p. 155
8.1 Background and terminology	p. 155
8.2 URA02 and PRA02	p. 158
8.3 Crampton-Loizou administrative model	p. 162
8.3.1 Flexibility of administrative scope	p. 163
8.3.2 Decentralization and autonomy	p. 164
8.3.3 A family of models for hierarchical administration	p. 164
8.4 Role control center	p. 169
8.4.1 Inheritance and the role graph	p. 170
8.4.2 Constraints	p. 172
8.4.3 Role views	p. 172
8.4.4 Delegation of administrative permissions	p. 173
8.4.5 Decentralization and autonomy	p. 176
References	p. 178
9 Enterprise Access Control Frameworks Using RBAC and XML Technologies	p. 179
9.1 Conceptual view of EAFs	p. 179
9.2 Enterprise Access Central Model Requirements	p. 182
9.2.1 EAM's multiple-policy support requirement	p. 183
9.2.2 EAM's ease of administration requirement	p. 183
9.3 EAM specification and XML schemas	p. 184
9.4 Specification of the ERBAC model in the XML schema	p. 186
9.4.1 XML schema specifications for ERBAC model elements	p. 187
9.4.2 XML schema specifications for ERBAC model relations	p. 190
9.5 Encoding of enterprise access control data in XML	p. 193
9.6 Verification of the ERBAC model and data specifications	p. 197
9.7 Limitations of XML schemas for ERBAC model constraint representation	p. 198
9.8 Using XML-encoded enterprise access control data for enterprisewide access control implementation	p. 202
9.9 Conclusion	p. 208
References	p. 208
10 Integrating RBAC with Enterprise IT Infrastructures	p. 211
10.1 RBAC for WFMSs	p. 212
10.1.1 Workflow Concepts and WFMSs	p. 212
10.1.2 WFMS components and access control requirements	p. 213
10.1.3 Access control design requirements	p. 214
10.1.4 RBAC model design and implementation requirements for WFMSs	p. 216
10.1.5 RBAC for workflows--research prototypes	p. 219
10.2 RBAC integration in Web environments	p. 220
10.2.1 Implementing RBAC entirely on the Web server	p. 221
10.2.2 Implementing RBAC for Web server access using cookies	p. 222
10.2.3 RBAC on the Web using attribute certificates	p. 224
10.3 RBAC for UNIX environments	p. 231
10.3.1 RBAC for UNIX administration	p. 231
10.3.2 RBAC implementation within the NFS	p. 236
10.4 RBAC in Java	p. 239
10.4.1 Evolution of Java security models	p. 240
10.4.2 JDK 1.2 security model and enhancement	p. 241
10.4.3 Incorporating RBAC into JDK 1.2 security model with JAAS	p. 244
10.5 RBAC for FDBSs	p. 246
10.5.1 IRO-DB architecture	p. 247
10.5.2 RBAC model implementation in IRO-DB	p. 248
10.6 RBAC in autonomous security service modules	p. 249
10.7 Conclusions	p. 251
References	p. 251
11 Migrating to RBAC--Case Study: Multiline Insurance Company	p. 255
11.1 Background	p. 256
11.2 Benefits of using RBAC to manage extranet users	p. 256
11.2.1 Simplifying systems administration and maintenance	p. 258
11.2.2 Enhancing organizational productivity	p. 259
11.3 Benefits of using RBAC to manage employees (intranet users)	p. 259
11.3.1 Reduction in new employee downtime	p. 259
11.3.2 Simplified systems administration and maintenance	p. 260
11.4 RBAC implementation costs	p. 260
11.4.1 Software and hardware expenses	p. 261
11.4.2 Systems administrators' labor expenses	p. 261
11.4.3 Role engineering expenses	p. 261
11.5 Time series of benefits and costs	p. 262
Reference	p. 264
12 RBAC Features in Commercial Products	p. 265
12.1 RBAC in relational DBMS products	p. 266
12.1.1 Informix Dynamic Server version 9.3 (IBM)	p. 267
12.1.2 Oracle Enterprise Server version 8i (Oracle)	p. 269
12.1.3 Sybase adaptive server version 12.5 (Sybase)	p. 271
12.2 RBAC in enterprise security administration software	p. 274
12.2.1 Control-SA (BMC software)	p. 276
12.2.2 DirXmetaRole version 1.0 (Siemens)	p. 280
12.2.3 SAM Jupiter (Systor)	p. 284
12.2.4 Tivoli Identity Manager version 1.1 (IBM)	p. 289
12.3 Conclusions	p. 292
References	p. 293
Appendix A	p. 295
Appendix B	p. 299
About the Authors	p. 303
Index	p. 305

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