Criminal dilemmas : understanding and preventing crime

Fighting crime breeds emotional responses which often lead to counter-productive government policy. To allow a rational analysis of these important concerns, this book employs the thinking of economics, political science, and game theory to develop new perspectives on crime and its causes. A basic assumption is that the criminal is a rational actor who makes decisions based on his or her personal expected gains and costs. By using this assumption, predictions about behaviour as well as emotional concerns such as prostitution and gun control are given a theoretical perspective. By understanding the strategic variables which cause, for example, gang wars and drug sales, we are better equipped to design effective public policy.

In the new edition, a chapter on police corruption has been added. The Gangs chapter has been updated and focuses more on evaluating competing hypotheses about gang organization and activity.

1 Alternative Sentencing	p. 1
1.1 Pisons	p. 8
1.1.1 Retibution	p. 8
1.1.2 Rehabilitation	p. 10
1.1.3 Deterrence	p. 13
1.2 Protection of the Public	p. 15
1.2.1 Violent Crime and Sex Predators	p. 15
1.2.1.1 Recidivism and Violence	p. 15
1.2.1.2 Sex Offenders	p. 16
1.2.1.3 Incapacitation	p. 19
1.2.2 Citicisms	p. 21
1.2.2.1 Three Strikes	p. 22
1.2.2.2 Alternative Sentencing	p. 25
1.2.3 Victim Compensation	p. 26
1.2.3.1 Victim Model	p. 27
1.2.3.2 Benefits	p. 29
1.2.3.3 Compensation	p. 31
1.2.3.4 Pain and Suffering	p. 31
1.2.4 Alternative Sentencing - Fitting the Crime	p. 32
1.3 Conclusion	p. 33
2 Private Prisons	p. 35
2.1 Pivatization Versus Public Service	p. 35
2.1.1 Positive Side	p. 36
2.1.2 Drawbacks	p. 38
2.2 Power and Money: Expanding Impisonment and Profit	p. 44
2.3 Conclusion	p. 47
3 Prostitution	p. 49
3.1 Victimless Crime	p. 49
3.1.1 Why is Prostitution Illegal?	p. 49
3.1.1.1 Prostitutes	p. 51
3.1.2 Disease	p. 52
3.1.3 Drugs	p. 55
3.1.4 Crime and Violence	p. 56
3.2 The Economics of Prostitution	p. 57
3.2.1 Results	p. 61
3.3 Consequences and Costs of Hiding	p. 62
3.4 Pimps and Illegal Prostitution	p. 64
3.4.1 Anti-Pimping Laws	p. 65
3.4.2 Pimp Model	p. 65
3.5 Unilateral Legalization	p. 70
3.6 Conclusion	p. 71
3.6.1 Policy	p. 71
3.6.1.1 Limited Control	p. 72
3.6.2 Regulation	p. 73
4 Drugs	p. 75
4.1 Introduction	p. 75
4.1.1 The Ailment	p. 75
4.1.2 The Cure	p. 76
4.2 Illegal Versus Legal Drugs	p. 77
4.2.1 Illegal	p. 77
4.2.1.1 Hidden but Available	p. 78
4.2.2 Legal	p. 80
4.3 Demand Versus Supply	p. 81
4.3.1 Demand	p. 81
4.3.2 Supply	p. 83
4.3.3 Illegal Drugs - Negative Effects	p. 85
4.3.3.1 Quality	p. 86
4.3.3.2 Youth	p. 87
4.4 Violence	p. 87
4.4.1 Anti-Competitive Strategies	p. 88
4.4.1.1 Legal Behavior	p. 90
4.4.12 Criminal Behavior	p. 91
4.4.1.3 Organization	p. 92
4.4.2 Anarchy	p. 94
4.4.2.1 Contracts	p. 95
4.4.2.2 Informal Mechanisms	p. 96
4.4.2.3 Employee Relations	p. 97
4.4.2.4 The Cure?	p. 97
4.5 Legalization	p. 98
4.5.1 Undercutting the Black Market	p. 98
4.5.2 Experimentation	p. 98
4.5.3 Addiction Control	p. 99
4.5.3.1 Inelastic Demand	p. 99
4.5.4 Control	p. 101
4.5.5 Resources	p. 100
4.6 Legal - The Zuich Problem	p. 104
4.6.1 Voting With One's Feet	p. 105
4.6.2 International Pisoners' Dilemma	p. 106
4.7 Conclusion	p. 106
5 Gangs	p. 109
5.1 Gangs as Drug Enterprises	p. 110
5.2 Gangs as Alliances	p. 112
5.2.1 Structure	p. 114
5.2.2 Protection in Numbers	p. 115
5.2.3 Protection of Numbers	p. 120
5.2.4 Economics	p. 121
5.3 Extortion Model	p. 122
5.4 Job Search and the Market for Crime	p. 127
5.5 Conclusion	p. 128
6 Gun Control	p. 131
6.1 Introduction	p. 131
6.2 Gun Control	p. 132
6.3 The Right to Bear Arms	p. 135
6.3.1 The Criminals Have Guns	p. 135
6.3.2 Guns for Self-Defense	p. 136
6.3.3 Firearm Accidents	p. 140
6.3.4 Information	p. 141
6.3.5 Black Market	p. 141
6.3.5.1 Buyers	p. 143
6.4 Deterrence	p. 145
6.4.1 Rural Versus Urban Characteristics	p. 145
6.4.2 Deterrence-the Fear of Armed Victims	p. 148
6.4.3 Open and Concealed Weapons	p. 148
6.5 Model	p. 151
6.5.1 Reputation: The Chain Store Paradox	p. 152
6.5.2 Massacres	p. 156
6.6 Statistics	p. 157
6.6.1 Accidental Deaths	p. 160
6.6.2 Gun Control	p. 161
6.6.3 Summary and Problems	p. 161
6.7 Implications and Suggestions	p. 162
6.7.1 Training	p. 162
6.7.2 Waiting Peiods	p. 164
6.7.3 Safeguards	p. 165
6.7.4 Penalties	p. 167
6.7.5 Caveat	p. 167
6.8 Conclusion	p. 169
7 Police	p. 171
7.1 Introduction	p. 171
7.2 Serve and Protect	p. 171
7.2.1 Anti-Shirking Policies	p. 173
7.2.2 Anti-Brutality Policies	p. 174
7.2.3 Contract Design	p. 177
7.2.4 Institutional Checks	p. 177
7.3 Discussion	p. 178
Bibliography	p. 181
Index	p. 199

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