Cover image for Game practice and the environment
Title:
Game practice and the environment
Series:
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) series on economics and the environment
Publication Information:
Cheltenham, UK : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2004
ISBN:
9781843766858

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30000010160508 HC79.E5 G35 2004 Open Access Book Book
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Summary

Summary

Game theory is one of the most powerful tools that economists can use to deal with complex economic and policy problems. At the same time, environmental issues are at the heart of many domestic and international policy processes, where interactions among different stakeholders play a crucial role. It is therefore natural to adopt game theory as one of the analytical instruments to enhance our understanding of the interrelations between the economy and the environment, and provide practical suggestions for policy interventions.

This book summarises the latest achievements of researchers involved in the application of game theory to the analysis of environmental matters. It provides an overview of different methods and applications, and gives the reader new insights on the solutions to complex environmental problems. The authors investigate various game theoretic approaches, including cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, and analyse both dynamic and static games. They illustrate the application of these approaches to global and local environmental problems, and present novel but effective tools to support environmental policy making. In particular, they focus on three important issues; climate negotiations and policy, the sharing of environmental costs, and environmental management and pollution control.

This book presents ground-breaking applications of game theory to deal with today's pressing environmental problems. It will become a valuable source of reference for academics and researchers interested in environmental economics and management, game theory and international relations.


Author Notes

Edited by Carlo Carraro, President, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (EAERE) and President Emeritus, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Italy and Vito Fragnelli, Associate Professor of Game Theory, University of Eastern Piedmont, Italy


Table of Contents

Carlo Carraro and Vito FragnelliSergio Currarini and Henry TulkensFrancesco Bosello and Barbara Buchner and Carlo Carraro and Davide RaggiCarlo Carraro and Carmen MarchioriJuan Carlos Ciscar and Antonio SoriaStef Hendrikus Tijs and Rodica BranzeiStefano MorettiVito Fragnelli and Maria Erminia MarinaHans KeidingGian Italo Bischi and Fabio Lamantia and Lucia SbragiaSjur Didrik Flam and Odd GodalSergio Currarini and Marco Marini
List of contributorsp. vii
Introductionp. 1
Part I Climate Negotiations and Policy
1 Stable international agreements on transfrontier pollution with ratification constraintsp. 9
2 Can equity enhance efficiency? Some lessons from climate negotiationsp. 37
3 Endogenous strategic issue linkage in international negotiationsp. 65
4 Kyoto and beyond Kyoto climate policy: comparison of open-loop and feedback game outcomesp. 87
Part II Sharing Environmental Costs
5 Cost sharing in a joint projectp. 113
6 A model for cooperative inter-municipal waste collection: cost evaluation toward fair cost allocationp. 125
7 Co-insurance games and environmental pollution riskp. 145
8 Environmental effects of consumption: an approach using DEA and cost sharingp. 164
Part III Environmental Management and Pollution Control
9 Competition and cooperation in natural resources exploitation: an evolutionary game approachp. 187
10 Greenhouse gases, quota exchange and oligopolistic competitionp. 212
11 A conjectural cooperative equilibrium for strategic form gamesp. 224
Indexp. 247