Markets, games, & strategic behavior

Select an Action

Place Hold(s)
Add to My Lists
Email
Print

Title:

Personal Author:

Holt, Charles A., 1948-

Publication Information:

Boston, MA : Pearson Addison Wesley, 2007

ISBN:

9780321419316

Subject Term:

Economics -- Study and teaching (Graduate) -- Simulation methods

Markets

Game theory

Negotiation in business

Available:*

Library	Item Barcode	Call Number	Material Type	Item Category 1	Status
Searching... PSZ JB	30000010121432	HB74.5 H67 2007	Open Access Book	Book	Searching... Unknown

Students become fluent in economics when they can apply the concepts in a real, decision-making and strategic environment. For this reason, an increasing number of professors are incorporating experiments into their undergraduate courses.

In his new text, Charles Holt begins each chapter with a lead-off experiment designed as an organizing device to introduce economic concepts such as the Winner's Curse, Asset Market Bubbles, and Rent Seeking. These experiments are easy to facilitate in the classroom, and may be run "by hand" or online via an internet browser.

Part 1 Basic Concepts: Decisions, Game Theory, and Market Equilibrium	p. 1
Chapter 1 Introduction	p. 3
1.1 Origins	p. 3
1.2 Overview	p. 5
1.3 Methodology	p. 8
1.4 A Brief History of Experimental Economics	p. 16
Questions	p. 18
Chapter 2 A Pit Market	p. 21
2.1 A Simple Example	p. 21
2.2 A Classroom Experiment	p. 22
2.3 Chamberlin's Results and Vernon Smith's Reaction	p. 27
2.4 Extensions	p. 31
Questions	p. 32
Chapter 3 Some Simple Games: Competition, Coordination, and Guessing	p. 35
3.1 Game Theory and the Prisoner's Dilemma	p. 35
3.2 A Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment	p. 37
3.3 A Coordination Game	p. 40
3.4 A Guessing Game	p. 42
3.5 Extensions	p. 44
Questions	p. 45
Chapter 4 Risk and Decision Making	p. 47
4.1 Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?	p. 47
4.2 A Simple Lottery-Choice Experiment	p. 50
4.3 Payoff Scale, Order, and Demographics Effects	p. 54
4.4 Extensions	p. 58
Questions	p. 58
Chapter 5 Randomized Strategies	p. 59
5.1 Symmetric Matching Pennies Games	p. 59
5.2 Battle of the Sexes	p. 63
5.3 Extensions	p. 67
Questions	p. 67
Part 2 Market Experiments	p. 69
Chapter 6 Monopoly and Cournot Markets	p. 71
6.1 Monopoly	p. 71
6.2 Cournot Duopoly	p. 75
6.3 Cournot Oligopoly	p. 77
6.4 Extensions	p. 80
Appendix Optional Quick Calculus Review	p. 80
Questions	p. 81
Chapter 7 Vertical Market Relationships	p. 83
7.1 Double Marginalization	p. 83
7.2 The Newsvendor Problem	p. 87
7.3 The Bullwhip Effect	p. 90
7.4 Extensions	p. 92
Questions	p. 93
Chapter 8 Market Institutions and Power	p. 95
8.1 Introduction	p. 95
8.2 The Exercise of Seller Market Power without Explicit Collusion	p. 99
8.3 Edgeworth Cycles and Random Prices	p. 102
8.4 The Effects of Market Power	p. 103
8.5 Extensions	p. 107
Appendix Calculation of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in Prices	p. 107
Questions	p. 109
Chapter 9 Collusion and Price Competition	p. 111
9.1 Collusion in Posted-Offer Markets: "This Is Economics"	p. 111
9.2 Collusion with Secret Discounts	p. 114
9.3 Extensions: Cheap Talk, Mutual Forbearance, and the "V Word"	p. 117
Questions	p. 120
Chapter 10 Market Failure Due to Unraveling: Lemons and Matching Markets	p. 123
10.1 Endogenous Product Quality	p. 123
10.2 Clearinghouse Mechanisms and Unraveling in Labor Markets	p. 127
10.3 Extensions: Baseball, Dorm Rooms, School Choice, Deep Space, Sorority Rush,...but Marriage?	p. 131
Questions	p. 131
Chapter 11 Asset Markets and Price Bubbles	p. 133
11.1 Bubbles and Crashes	p. 133
11.2 A Digression on Present Value	p. 137
11.3 The Limit Order Market Experiment	p. 138
11.4 Other Research on the Call Market Institution	p. 141
Questions	p. 143
Part 3 Bargaining and Behavioral Labor Economics	p. 145
Chapter 12 Ultimatum Bargaining	p. 147
12.1 Strategic Advantage and Ultimatums	p. 147
12.2 Bargaining in the Bush	p. 148
12.3 Bargaining in the Lab	p. 151
12.4 Multi-Stage Bargaining	p. 153
12.5 Extensions: "I Will Be Spending Years Trying to Figure Out What This All Meant"	p. 156
Questions	p. 157
Chapter 13 Trust, Reciprocity, and Principal-Agent Games	p. 159
13.1 The Trust Game	p. 159
13.2 A Labor Market Reciprocity Game	p. 162
13.4 Extensions: Field Experiments	p. 164
Questions	p. 165
Part 4 Public Choice	p. 167
Chapter 14 Voluntary Contributions	p. 169
14.1 Social Norms and Public Goods	p. 169
14.2 "Economists Free-Ride, Does Anyone Else?"	p. 171
14.3 Single-Round Experiments	p. 172
14.4 Multi-Round Experiments	p. 176
14.5 Extensions	p. 178
Questions	p. 180
Chapter 15 The Volunteer's Dilemma	p. 183
15.1 Sometimes It Only Takes One Hero	p. 183
15.2 Initial Experimental Evidence	p. 184
15.3 The Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium	p. 186
15.4 An Experiment on Group Size Effects	p. 189
15.5 Extensions	p. 191
Questions	p. 191
Chapter 16 Externalities, Congestion, and Common Pool Resources	p. 193
16.1 Water	p. 194
16.2 Ducks and Traffic	p. 195
16.3 Fish	p. 200
16.4 Extensions	p. 202
Questions	p. 203
Chapter 17 Rent Seeking	p. 205
17.1 Government with "a Smokestack on Its Back"	p. 205
17.2 Rent Seeking in the Classroom Laboratory	p. 207
17.3 The Nash Equilibrium	p. 208
17.4 Comparative Statics for Changes in Cost and the Number of Competitors	p. 209
17.5 Extensions	p. 210
Questions	p. 212
Chapter 18 Voting and Politics Experiments	p. 215
18.1 The Median Voter Theorem	p. 215
18.2 Experimental Tests of Spatial Voting Models	p. 217
18.3 Fairness and Deviations from Core Outcomes	p. 220
18.4 Legislative Bargaining	p. 221
18.5 Agendas and Strategic Voting	p. 222
18.6 Polls, Runoffs, and Other Coordinating Devices	p. 224
18.7 Participation Games	p. 225
18.8 Field Experiments	p. 227
18.9 Extensions	p. 228
Questions	p. 229
Part 5 Auctions	p. 231
Chapter 19 Private Value Auctions	p. 233
19.1 Introduction	p. 233
19.2 Auctions: Up, Down, and the "Little Magical Elf"	p. 234
19.3 Bidding against a Uniform Distribution	p. 237
19.4 Bidding Behavior in a Two-Person, First-Price Auction	p. 240
19.5 Extensions	p. 242
Appendix Risk Aversion	p. 244
Questions	p. 246
Chapter 20 The Takeover Game	p. 247
20.1 Wall Street (the Film)	p. 247
20.2 A Takeover Game Experiment	p. 248
20.3 Quality Unraveling	p. 250
20.4 Extensions: The Loser's Curse	p. 252
Questions	p. 252
Chapter 21 Common-Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse	p. 255
21.1 "I Won the Auction but I Wish I Hadn't"	p. 255
21.2 The Nash Equilibrium	p. 258
21.3 The Winner's Curse	p. 261
21.4 Extensions	p. 262
Questions	p. 263
Chapter 22 Multi-Unit and Combinatorial Auctions	p. 265
22.1 Dry 2K	p. 265
22.2 FCC Bandwidth Auctions and Package Bidding Alternatives	p. 272
22.3 Experimental Tests of Package Bidding Alternatives	p. 276
22.4 Extensions	p. 278
Questions	p. 279
Part 6 Behavioral Game Theory: Treasures and Intuitive Contradictions	p. 281
Chapter 23 Multi-Stage Games	p. 285
23.1 Extensive Forms and Strategies	p. 285
23.2 Two-Stage Trust Games	p. 288
23.3 The Centipede Game	p. 291
23.4 Extensions	p. 292
Questions	p. 293
Chapter 24 Generalized Matching Pennies	p. 295
24.1 The Case of Balanced Payoffs	p. 295
24.2 Noisy Best Responses	p. 296
24.3 The Effects of Payoff Imbalances	p. 299
24.4 Probabilistic Choice	p. 302
24.5 Extensions	p. 304
Questions	p. 305
Chapter 25 The Traveler's Dilemma	p. 307
25.1 A Vacation with an Unhappy Ending?	p. 307
25.2 Data	p. 309
25.3 Learning and Experience	p. 310
25.4 Iterated Rationality and Quantal Response Equilibrium	p. 312
25.5 Extensions	p. 316
Appendix Bounded Rationality in the Traveler's Dilemma-A Spreadsheet-Based Analysis	p. 318
Questions	p. 323
Chapter 26 Coordination Games	p. 325
26.1 "The Minimum Effort Game? That's One I Can Play!"	p. 325
26.2 Nash Equilibria, Numbers Effects, and Experimental Evidence	p. 328
26.3 Effort-Cost Effects	p. 329
26.4 Equilibrium with Noisy Behavior	p. 331
26.5 Extensions	p. 333
Appendix An Analysis of Noisy Behavior in the Coordination Game	p. 334
Questions	p. 337
Part 7 Individual Decision Experiments	p. 339
Chapter 27 Probability Matching	p. 341
27.1 Being Treated Like a Rat	p. 341
27.2 Are Rats Really More Rational Than Humans?	p. 342
27.3 Siegel and Goldstein's Experiments	p. 343
27.4 A Simple Model of Belief Learning	p. 345
27.5 Reinforcement Learning	p. 346
27.6 Extensions	p. 347
Questions	p. 348
Chapter 28 Lottery Choice Anomalies	p. 351
28.1 Introduction	p. 351
28.2 The Allais Paradox	p. 352
28.3 Prospect Theory: Probability Misperception	p. 354
28.4 Prospect Theory: Gains, Losses, and "Reflection Effects"	p. 356
28.5 Extensions	p. 359
Questions	p. 360
Chapter 29 ISO (in Search of...)	p. 361
29.1 Introduction	p. 361
29.2 Search from a Uniform Distribution	p. 362
29.3 Experimental Data	p. 363
29.4 Optimal Search	p. 364
29.5 Extensions	p. 366
Questions	p. 367
Part 8 Information, Learning, and Signaling	p. 369
Chapter 30 Bayes' Rule	p. 371
30.1 Introduction	p. 371
30.2 A Simple Example and a Counting Heuristic	p. 373
30.3 Relating the Counting Heuristic to Bayes' Rule	p. 376
30.4 Experimental Results	p. 378
30.5 Bayes' Rule with Elicited Probabilities	p. 379
30.6 A Follow-Up Experiment with a Rare Event	p. 382
30.7 Extensions	p. 383
Appendix Truthful Elicitation	p. 384
Questions	p. 385
Chapter 31 Information Cascades	p. 389
31.1 "To Do Exactly as Your Neighbors Do Is the Only Sensible Rule"	p. 389
31.2 A Model of Rational Learning from Others' Decisions	p. 390
31.3 Experimental Evidence	p. 392
31.4 Extensions	p. 395
Questions	p. 396
Chapter 32 Statistical Discrimination	p. 397
32.1 "Brown-Eyed People Are More Civilized"	p. 397
32.2 Being Purple or Green	p. 399
32.3 Data on Statistical Discrimination	p. 401
32.4 "Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?"	p. 405
32.5 Extensions	p. 406
Appendix Derivation of the Discriminatory Equilibrium	p. 407
Questions	p. 408
Chapter 33 Signaling Games	p. 409
33.1 Real Men Don't Eat Quiche	p. 409
33.2 Separating Equilibria	p. 410
33.3 Pooling	p. 412
33.4 Unintuitive Beliefs and Reverse Type Dependence	p. 413
33.5 "Stripped Down Poker"	p. 416
33.6 Extensions: "Too Cool for School"	p. 419
Questions	p. 420
Chapter 34 Prediction Markets	p. 423
34.1 The Rationale for Prediction Markets	p. 423
34.2 The Success of Political Event Markets	p. 426
34.3 Information Aggregation and "Common Value Trading"	p. 428
34.4 Extensions	p. 431
Questions	p. 431
References	p. 433
Index	p. 451

Available:*

On Order

Summary

Summary

Table of Contents