Risk methodologies for technological legacies

The Cold War Era left the major participants, the United States and the former Soviet Union (FSU), with large legacies in terms of both contamination and potential accidents. Facility contamination and environmental degradation, as well as the accident vulnerable facilities and equipment, are a result of weapons development, testing, and production. Although the countries face similar issues from similar activities, important differences in waste management practices make the potential environmental and health risks of more immediate concern in the FSU and Eastern Europe. In the West, most nuclear and chemical waste is stored in known contained locations, while in the East, much of the equivalent material is unconfined, contaminating the environment. In the past decade, the U.S. started to address and remediate these Cold War legacies. Costs have been very high, and the projected cost estimates for total cleanup are still increasing. Currently in Russia, the resources for starting such major activities continue to be unavailable.

List of Contributors	p. ixx
Preface	p. xxiii
Acknowledgments	p. xxvii
1. Introduction	p. 1
Part I Unifying Risk Management and Risk Analysis for Decision Makers	p. 5
2. Complementary Risk Management: A Unified View for Decision Makers	p. 7
2.1 A Short History of Risk Assessment Traditions	p. 7
2.2 Defining Risk Analysis	p. 9
2.3 Risk Management	p. 15
2.4 Risk Perception	p. 22
2.5 Complementary Risk Management	p. 27
2.6 References	p. 27
Part II Legacies	p. 29
3. Radiation Legacy of the Soviet Nuclear Complex	p. 31
3.1 Background	p. 32
3.2 Extraction, Enrichment, and Processing of Uranium Ores	p. 34
3.3 Production of Uranium Hexafluoride and Isotopic Enrichment of Uranium	p. 35
3.4 Manufacture of Nuclear Fuel	p. 38
3.5 Production of Plutonium and Radiochemical Processing of Spent Nuclear Fuel	p. 40
3.6 Production of Nuclear Weapons	p. 48
3.7 Ship Nuclear Propulsion Plants and Their Infrastructure	p. 48
3.8 Nuclear Explosions	p. 52
3.9 Conclusion	p. 57
3.10 References	p. 57
4. Status and Challenges of Managing Risks in the U.S. Department of Energy Environmental Management Program	p. 59
4.1 Cold War Legacy Challenges	p. 61
4.2 New Approach to Risk Management--Risk/Hazard Profiles	p. 65
4.3 Relative Hazard and Risk Measure Methodology	p. 70
4.4 Conclusions	p. 73
4.5 References	p. 74
5. Perception of Risk, Health, and Inequality	p. 75
5.1 General Setting of the Study	p. 76
5.2 Risk Perception	p. 77
5.3 Health and Environmental Concerns	p. 78
5.4 Risk Perception and Socio-Economic Factors	p. 80
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions	p. 83
5.6 References	p. 85
6. Risk-Based Ranking Experiences for Cold War Legacy Facilities in the United States	p. 87
6.1 Background	p. 88
6.2 Risk-Based Ranking Approaches	p. 88
6.3 Quantitative Health and Environmental Risk Estimation	p. 93
6.4 Facility-Wide Application Experience	p. 94
6.5 Lessons Learned: Factors to be Considered and Managed	p. 100
6.6 Conclusion	p. 103
6.7 References	p. 103
7. Cleanup of Radioactive Floating Refuse at Vromos Bay	p. 107
7.1 Conditions Before Restoration	p. 108
7.2 Initial Restoration, 1991-1994	p. 112
7.3 PHARE Project, 1995	p. 113
7.4 Project Results	p. 117
7.5 References	p. 120
8. Integrated Accident Risk Analysis and Applications for the Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions	p. 123
8.1 Managing Chemical Demilitarisation	p. 124
8.2 Quantitative Risk Assessment Methodology Overview	p. 130
8.3 Presentation of Risk Results	p. 142
8.4 Application to Cold War Legacy Facilities	p. 147
8.5 References	p. 147
9. Environmental Radiation Does Reconstruction for U.S. and Russian Weapons Production Facilities: Hanford and Mayak	p. 149
9.1 U.S. and Russian Production Facilities	p. 150
9.2 Approaches to Dose Reconstruction: The Hanford Environmental Dose Reconstruction Project	p. 155
9.3 Approaches to Dose Reconstruction: The Techa River Dosimetry System 2000	p. 163
9.4 Representative Doses to Members of the Public	p. 172
9.5 Conclusions	p. 178
9.6 References	p. 179
10. Quantitative Risk Assessment Methods of Accounting for Probabilistic and Deterministic Data Applied to Complex Systems	p. 183
10.1 Background	p. 184
10.2 Assessment Methodology	p. 184
10.3 Conclusion	p. 198
Part III Analyses and Programs Applicable to Legacies	p. 201
11. Environmental Risk Assessment of Installations and Sites Inherited from the Cold War Period in Bulgaria	p. 203
11.1 Types of Installations and Sites	p. 204
11.2 Environmental Issues and Organizations to Deal With Them	p. 204
11.3 Approaches to Risk Assessment	p. 205
11.4 Commonalities of the Two Approaches	p. 208
11.5 Conclusion	p. 210
12. Radiation Factors Risk Assessment Within the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant Exclusion Zone	p. 211
12.1 Background	p. 211
12.2 The Chornobyl Catastrophe	p. 214
12.3 Transport of Contaminants Through the Environment	p. 215
12.4 Modelling Strontium-90 Transport Through Exclusion Zone Water Systems	p. 221
12.5 Conclusions	p. 223
12.6 References	p. 229
13. Psychological Aspects of Risk Assessment and Management	p. 231
13.1 Differences in Risk Perception Between Experts and Lay People	p. 232
13.2 External Factors and Motivation in Risk Perception Among the Population	p. 235
13.3 Developing an Information Strategy Based on Psychological Aspects of Risk Perception	p. 237
13.4 Conclusions	p. 242
13.5 References	p. 242
14. Utilizing a Multimedia Approach for Risk Analysis of Environmental Systems	p. 245
14.1 Initial Development of Risk Modelling Capabilities	p. 246
14.2 Need for More Complex Systems	p. 246
14.3 An Integrated Risk-Assessment Software System	p. 247
14.4 Using an Integrated System for a Complex Analysis	p. 249
14.5 Conclusions	p. 254
14.6 References	p. 254
15. Using Integrated Quantitative Risk Assessment to Optimise Safety in Chemical Installations	p. 255
15.1 Master Logic Diagram	p. 256
15.2 Event Tree-Fault Tree Analysis	p. 259
15.3 Accident Sequence Quantification	p. 260
15.4 Modification of the Frequency of Loss of Containment According to the Safety Management System	p. 261
15.5 Case Study	p. 262
15.6 Conclusions	p. 268
15.7 References	p. 268
16. Site-Specific Modification of Ground-Water Generic Criteria as Applied to a Contaminated Site	p. 271
16.1 Development of Generic Criteria for Ground-Water--Component Selection	p. 273
16.2 Site-Specific Modification of Generic Criteria--Value Selection	p. 273
16.3 Risk Management Decisions Based on the Site-Speific Modified Ground-Water Criteria	p. 286
16.4 Conclusions	p. 289
16.5 References	p. 289
Part IV Future Directions	p. 291
17. East Meets West: Teaming on Risk Assessment	p. 293
17.1 Why Here, Why Now?	p. 293
17.2 Network Goals and Objectives	p. 295
17.3 Network Organisation	p. 296
17.4 Initial Successes	p. 297
17.5 The Future	p. 297
18. Where Are We Going?	p. 299
18.1 View from the West: Methodologies and Applications	p. 300
18.2 View from the East: Implementation	p. 302
18.3 As Challenges Evolve	p. 305
18.4 References	p. 306
Appendix A Programme from NATO Advanced Study Institute, Risk Assessment Activities for the Cold War Facilities and Environmental Legacies	p. 309
Appendix B Acronyms and Abbreviations Used in Text	p. 319
Appendix C Cross Cultural Guide to the Book	p. 325
Index	p. 363

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