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Cover image for Network intrusion detection : an analyst's handbook
Title:
Network intrusion detection : an analyst's handbook
Personal Author:
Edition:
2nd ed.
Publication Information:
Indianapolis, Ind. : New Riders, 2001
ISBN:
9780735710085

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30000004944652 TK5105.59 N673 2000 Open Access Book Book
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Summary

Summary

A training aid and reference for intrusion detection analysts. The authors have been through the trenches and give you access to unusual and unique data.


Author Notes

Stephen Northcutt is a graduate of Mary Washington College. He is the author of Incident Handling: Step-by-Step and Intrusion Detection: Shadow Style, both published by the SANS Institute. He was the original developer of the Shadow intrusion detection system and served as the leader of the Department of Defense's Shadow Intrusion Detection Team for two years. Formerly the Director of the U.S. Navy's Information System Security Office at the Naval Security Warfare Center, he is currently the Chief Information Warfare Officer for the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Stephen is a featured lecturer and co-chair of the SANS Conference and is the program chair of the first Intrustion Detection Conference.


Excerpts

Excerpts

Introduction Our goal in writing Network Intrusion Detection, Third Edition has been toempower you as an analyst. We believe that if you read this book cover to cover,and put the material into practice as you go, you will be ready to enter theworld of intrusion analysis. Many people have read our books, or attended ourlive class offered by SANS, and the lights have gone on; then, they are off tothe races. We will cover the technical material, the workings of TCP/IP, andalso make every effort to help you understand how an analyst thinks throughdozens of examples. Network Intrusion Detection, Third Edition is offered in five parts. Part I,"TCP/IP," begins with Chapter 1, ranging from an introduction to thefundamental concepts of the Internet protocol to a discussion of RemoteProcedure Calls (RPCs). We realize that it has become stylish to begin a booksaying a few words about TCP/IP, but the system Judy and I have developed hasnot only taught more people IP but a lot more about IP as well--more thanany other system ever developed. We call it "real TCP" because thematerial is based on how packets actually perform on the network, not theory.Even if you are familiar with IP, give the first part of the book a look. We areconfident you will be pleasantly surprised. Perhaps the most important chapterin Part I is Chapter 5, "Stimulus and Response." Whenever you look ata network trace, the first thing you need to determine is if it is a stimulus ora response. This helps you to properly analyze the traffic. Please take the timeto make sure you master this material; it will prevent analysis errors as youmove forward. Tip Whenever you look at a network trace, thefirst thing you need to determine is if it is a stimulus or a response. The book continues in Part II, "Traffic Analysis" with a discussionof traffic analysis. By this, we mean analyzing the network traffic byconsideration of the header fields of the IP and higher protocol fields.Although ASCII and hex signatures are a critical part of intrusion detection,they are only tools in the analyst's tool belt. Also in Part II, we beginto show you the importance of each field, how they are rich treasures tounderstanding. Every field has meaning, and fields provide information bothabout the sender of the packet and its intended purpose. As this part of thebook comes to a close, we tell you stories from the perspective of an analystseeing network patterns for the first time. The goal is to help you prepare forthe day when you will face an unknown pattern. Although there are times a network pattern is so obvious it almost screamsits message, more often you have to search for events of interest. Sometimes,you can do this with a well-known signature, but equally often, you must searchfor it. Whenever attackers write software for denial of service, or exploits,the software tends to leave a signature that is the result of crafting thepacket. This is similar to the way that a bullet bears the marks of the barrelof the gun that fired it, and experts can positively identify the gun by thebullet. In Part III of the book, "Filters/Rules for NetworkMonitoring" we build the skills to examine any field in the packet and theknowledge to determine what is normal and what is anomalous. In this section, wepractice these skills both with TCPdump and also Snort. In Part IV, we consider the larger framework of intrusion detection. Wediscuss where you should place sensors, what a console needs to support for dataanalysis, and automated and manual response issues to intrusion detection. Inaddition, this section helps arm the analyst with information about how theintrusion detection capability fits in with the business model of theorganization. Finally, this book provides three appendixes that reference common signaturesof well-known reconnaissance, denial of service, and exploit scans. We believeyou will find this to be no fluff, packed with data from the first to the lastpage. Network Intrusion Detection, Third Edition has not been developed byprofessional technical writers. Judy and I have been working as analysts since1996 and have faced a number of new patterns. We are thankful for thisopportunity to share our experiences and insights with you and hope this bookwill be of service to you in your journey as an intrusion analyst. (c) Copyright Pearson Education. All rights reserved. Excerpted from Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst's Handbook by Stephen Northcutt, Judy Novak All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.

Table of Contents

Introductionp. xviii
1 IP Conceptsp. 1
The TCP/IP Internet Modelp. 2
Packaging (Beyond Paper or Plastic)p. 4
Addressesp. 9
Service Portsp. 12
IP Protocolsp. 13
Domain Name Systemp. 15
Routing: How You Get There From Herep. 16
Summaryp. 18
2 Introduction to TCP dump and Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)p. 19
TCP dumpp. 20
Introduction to TCPp. 25
TCP Gone Awryp. 31
Summaryp. 34
3 Fragmentationp. 35
Theory of Fragmentationp. 36
Malicious Fragmentationp. 44
Summaryp. 46
4 ICMPp. 49
ICMP Theoryp. 49
Mapping Techniquesp. 52
Normal ICMP Activityp. 57
Malicious ICMP Activityp. 60
To Block or Not To Blockp. 66
Summaryp. 67
Hardware-Based IDp. 214
Defense in Depthp. 214
Program-Based IDp. 215
Smart Auditorsp. 216
Summaryp. 216
13 Exploits and Scans to Apply Exploitsp. 217
False Positivesp. 217
IMAP Exploitsp. 225
Scans to Apply Exploitsp. 228
Single Exploit, Portmapp. 233
Summaryp. 240
14 Denial of Servicep. 241
Brute-Force Denial-of-Service Tracesp. 242
Elegant Killsp. 246
nmap 2.53p. 250
Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacksp. 251
Summaryp. 254
15 Detection of Intelligence Gatheringp. 255
Network and Host Mappingp. 256
NetBIOS-Specific Tracesp. 265
Stealth Attacksp. 267
Measuring Response Timep. 272
Viruses as Information Gatherersp. 274
Summaryp. 278
16 The Trouble with RPCsp. 279
portmapperp. 279
dump Is a Core Component of rpcinfop. 282
Attacks That Directly Access an RPC Servicep. 284
The Big Threep. 287
Analysis Under Firep. 287
Oh nmap!p. 291
Summaryp. 294
17 Filters to Detect, Filters to Protectp. 295
The Mechanics of Writing TCPdump Filtersp. 296
Bit Maskingp. 297
TCPdump IP Filtersp. 300
TCPdump UDP Filtersp. 302
TCPdump TCP Filtersp. 304
Summaryp. 308
18 System Compromisep. 309
Christmas Eve 1998p. 310
Where Attackers Shopp. 323
Communications Networkp. 325
Anonymityp. 328
Summaryp. 328
19 The Hunt for Timexp. 329
The Tracesp. 329
The Hunt Beginsp. 331
Y2Kp. 339
Sources Foundp. 343
Miscellaneous Findingsp. 343
Summary Checklistp. 347
Epilogue and Purposep. 347
Summaryp. 348
20 Organizational Issuesp. 349
Organizational Security Modelp. 349
Defining Riskp. 353
Riskp. 354
Defining the Threatp. 359
Risk Management Is Dollar Drivenp. 363
How Risky Is a Risk?p. 363
Summaryp. 365
21 Automated and Manual Responsep. 367
Automated Responsep. 368
Honeypotp. 373
Manual Responsep. 375
Summaryp. 383
22 Business Case for Intrusion Detectionp. 385
Part 1 Management Issuesp. 387
Part 2 Threats and Vulnerabilitiesp. 391
Part 3 Tradeoffs and Recommended Solutionp. 395
Repeat the Executive Summaryp. 400
Summaryp. 400
Indexp. 403
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