Cover image for Risk in the global real estate market : international risk regulation, mechanism design, foreclosures, title systems, and REITs
Title:
Risk in the global real estate market : international risk regulation, mechanism design, foreclosures, title systems, and REITs
Personal Author:
Series:
Wiley finance

Wiley finance series
Publication Information:
Hoboken N.J. : John Wiley & Sons, c2011
Physical Description:
xxii, 433 p. ; 24 cm.
ISBN:
9781118011355

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30000010297728 HD1375 N86 2011 Open Access Book Book
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Summary

Summary

Essential reading for professional investors, risk managers, regulators, central bankers, and real estate professionals, Risk in the Global Real Estate Market: International Risk Regulation, Mechanism Design, Foreclosures, Title Systems, and REITs takes an international look at the ways in which U.S.-style constitutional laws, financial laws, and real estate laws in various countries affect global economics and risk; and analyzes specific constraints that deter market development such as Asset Liability Matching, inappropriate financial products, land title systems, inefficient constitutions and human biases.

The sub-prime mortgage crisis (that began around 2006) and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007?2010 disrupted the economies of various countries and exposed many of the psychological, social, and economic problems inherent in the legal/risk infrastructure for mortgages, land title systems, REITs, securitization, and pensions. In this remarkable new book, Michael Nwogugu explains how these processes and statutes are unconstitutional and inefficient, and how they influence demand for housing, real estate prices, retirement savings, household wealth, consumer disposable income, marriage opportunities, job markets, crime, and regional economic growth. The resulting major economic and public health problems have continued to reduce the quality-of-life of nations, and continue to cause permanent declines in wealth, increases in crime and delinquency, high divorce rates, depression, and inadequate job creation, among other problems. The book examines a range of fields'including mechanism design, psychology, risk finance, and corporate governance;  and emphasizes Constitutional economics as a distinct dimension of risk analysis.

Risk in the Global Real Estate Market makes a compelling case about how constitutional torts increase information asymmetry, transaction costs, agency problems, and compliance costs, as well as inefficiency in real estate transactions. These problems, the book argues, are not unique to the United States, but also affect Commonwealth countries and other nations that have developed regulations that are similar to, or are based on U.S. commercial, securities, and or constitutional laws.

Risk in the Global Real Estate Market presents a novel analysis of the sub-prime crisis (that first began in 2006), the failure of securitization (CMBS/MBS) markets, the Global Financial Crisis, and socio-economic problems caused by traditional mortgages and securitization. The book reveals that many of the statutes and processes that define mortgages, foreclosures, securitization, and REITs in the United States (and many common-law countries and nations that have adopted American-style real estate regulations) are fundamentally unconstitutional and inefficient, and have lasting negative effects on consumer psychology, the demand for real estate, price discovery in property markets, economic growth, and quality of life. The book examines the nature of constitutional torts and property rights as the foundation for business transactions and economic growth within the context of risk regulation, interstate commerce, takings, and legislation.

Risk in the Global Real Estate Market introduces new theories of consumer psychology and institutional dynamics in real estate transactions; presents new theories of takings, and also surveys psychology/psychiatry studies (based on data from various countries) that confirm the harmful effects of mortgages, securitization, and foreclosures. Using elements of mechanism design, Michael Nwogugu develops new efficient financial products (Mortgage-Alternatives products), and presents a policy framework for a unified ?Mortgage-Alternatives? market for the CEE/CIS region and China. He also explains why Asset Liability Matching hinders lending, capital formation and risk management, especially in developing countries.


Author Notes

MICHAEL C. I. NWOGUGU is an author and entrepreneur based in New Jersey; and is  affiliated with two companies. Mr. Nwogugu has been a co-founder of several new ventures in the technology/Internet, business services, and healthcare sectors. He has reviewed articles for the European Journal of Operational Research and the American Statistician and has written and published articles on real estate, constitutional economics, and finance in international refereed journals such as Managerial Auditing Journal; International Company and Commercial Law Review; Journal of Derivatives & Hedge Funds; Applied Mathematics and Computation; Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation; Computer and Telecommunications Law Review; Journal of Risk Finance; Corporate Ownership & Control; International Journal of Mathematics, Game Theory, and Algebra; and Chaos and Complexity Letters. Mr. Nwogugu earned a graduate degree in business from Columbia University in New York City; and degrees in architecture from City University Of New York, and University Of Nigeria (Nigeria).


Table of Contents

Prefacep. xvii
Chapter 1 Regulation and Constitutional Tortsp. 1
Federalism, Preemption, and Riskp. 2
The Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (RAFSA)p. 6
The Existing "Tests" for Unconstitutionalityp. 6
Quasi Constitutionsp. 10
Social Capitalp. 10
Referencesp. 11
Chapter 2 A Critique of Mechanism Designp. 13
Conclusionp. 16
Referencep. 16
Chapter 3 General Public Health and Social Psychology Issues in Global Housing Markets and Mortgage Marketsp. 17
Survey of Public Health Problems Caused by Traditional Mortgages and Foreclosuresp. 18
Conclusionp. 32
Referencesp. 32
Chapter 4 Public Health Issues: Psychological Factors Inherent in Housing Demand, Mortgage Demand, and House Pricesp. 37
Proposition 1: Credit Biasp. 44
Proposition 2: The S&L Crisis Effectp. 44
Proposition 3: Tenure Biasp. 45
Proposition 4: Low Willingness to Accept Losses (WTAL)p. 46
Proposition 5: Investment Horizon Effectp. 46
Proposition 6: The Deferred-Disutility/Deferred Pain Biasp. 47
Proposition 7: The Lender-Experience Effectp. 48
Proposition 8: The Government Intervention Effectp. 49
Proposition 9: The Multiple-Listing-Service (MLS) Effectp. 50
Proposition 10: Psychological Limitations on Supply of Housing Unitsp. 50
Validity of Housing Demand Modelsp. 52
Conclusionp. 53
Referencesp. 53
Chapter 5 Behavioral Biases in Property Taxation and Property Appraisalp. 59
Biases in Property Taxationp. 60
Psychological Effects and Biases Inherent in Property Appraisalp. 64
Conclusionp. 76
Referencesp. 77
Chapter 6 Foreclosure Statutes and Processesp. 83
Foreclosures Reduce the Efficiency of Monetary Policies and Fiscal Policiesp. 83
Some Adverse Contagion Effects of Foreclosuresp. 84
The Statutory Ban of Waiver of Judicial Foreclosure in Conveyancing Documents and the Omission of Nonjudicial Foreclosure from States' Laws Are Unconstitutionalp. 85
The Borrower's Post-Foreclosure Right of Redemption Is Unconstitutionalp. 93
The Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Foreclosure Rulesp. 98
Enforcement of Core Foreclosure Processes and the Failure to Enact Uniform Federal Foreclosure and Mortgage Statutes Constitute Violations of the U.S. Constitutionp. 103
Alternative Foreclosure Systemsp. 109
New Theories of Takingsp. 109
Conclusionp. 112
Referencesp. 112
Chapter 7 Unconstitutionality of U.S. Bankruptcy Code, Preemption of State-Law Mortgage Foreclosure Statutes, and Related Economic Effectsp. 115
Existing Literaturep. 116
Survey of Macroeconomic Effects of Bankruptcy Codesp. 118
The Financial Accelerator Theory Is Inaccuratep. 126
Criteria for Preemption: Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfers (the "Reasonably Equivalent Value" Doctrine), the Deprizio Controversy, and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005p. 127
The U.S. Supreme Court's Standards for Preemption Casesp. 132
New Standards for Preemption Casesp. 135
Constitutional Law Issuesp. 139
Due Process Rightsp. 140
The Separation-of-Powers Doctrinep. 144
A New Theory of Takingsp. 144
Conclusionp. 145
Notep. 146
Referencesp. 147
Chapter 8 Mortgages and Deeds of Trustp. 151
Improper Coupling/Combinations of Mortgage Markets, Rental Markets, Savings/Investment Markets, and Property-Value Marketsp. 152
Mortgages Cause Fraud and Misallocation of Riskp. 153
Traditional and Alternative Mortgages Are Inefficient and Create Wrong Incentivesp. 154
Mortgages Reduce the Efficiency of Monetary Transmissionp. 155
The Mortgage Wealth Illusion: Inefficient Household Allocations and Reduction of the Marginal Propensity to Savep. 160
Traditional and Alternative Western Mortgages Reduce Socioeconomic Flexibility that Substantially Affects Psychological Well-Beingp. 161
Traditional and Alternative Mortgages Distort the Marriage Marketp. 162
Traditional Western Mortgages and Alternative Mortgages Distort the Job Marketp. 163
The Statutory or Common Law Prohibition of Prepayment Penalty/Yield Maintenance or Limitations on Prepayment Penalty on Default Are Unconstitutionalp. 165
The Lack of Definition of the "Future Advances" Clause in Mortgages Constitutes a Violation of the U.S. Constitutionp. 172
The Government's Failure to Enact Statutes that Define the Qualifications/Characteristics of a First Mortgageep. 173
The Lender's Right to Receive Proceeds of Insurance and Condemnation (Arising from Real Estate) Is Not Codifiedp. 176
Anti-Deficiency Statutes Are Unconstitutional and the Lender's Right to Deficiency Judgment Must Remain Enforceablep. 180
New Theories of Takingsp. 190
Conclusionp. 191
Notesp. 192
Referencesp. 192
Chapter 9 Subprime Lending Is Unconstitutionalp. 197
The State-Action Requirement: The Substitution Theory and Failure-to-Act as State Actionp. 198
Subprime Lending Is Unconstitutionalp. 198
Conclusionp. 201
Notep. 201
Referencesp. 202
Chapter 10 Constitutionality of Real Property Title Systemsp. 205
The Recording System and the Registration/Torrens System Are Unconstitutionalp. 205
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Title Systems, and Conflict of Lawsp. 213
Conclusionp. 217
Referencesp. 218
Chapter 11 Constitutionality of Real Estate Investment Trustsp. 219
The REIT Ownership-Concentration Rules Are Unconstitutionalp. 227
The Regulation of REITs by U.S. States Constitutes Violations of the U.S. Constitutionp. 233
The Entire REIT-Qualification Statutes (IRC Section-856, RMA, and AJCA REIT-Qualification Rules) Are Unconstitutionalp. 235
The Mandatory REIT Dividend Payout Rule Violates the U.S. Constitutionp. 242
The Government's Failure to Regulate Management Agreements of REITs Constitutes a Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitutionp. 245
REITs Are Unconstitutional Because They Result in Illegal Misconductp. 246
A New Theory of Takingsp. 246
Conclusionp. 247
Referencesp. 247
Chapter 12 Asset Securitization Is Unconstitutional and Should Be Bannedp. 249
Securitization Dampens Monetary Transmission and Provides Wrong Incentives for Banks and Sponsorsp. 250
Securitization Increases Transaction Costs, Systemic Risk, Inflation, and Hedging Costsp. 257
Securitization Constitutes a Violation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitutionp. 260
Securitization Constitutes a Violation of the Free Speech Clausep. 261
Securitization Constitutes a Violation of the Right-to-Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Is Illegalp. 262
Securitization Constitutes a Violation of the Equal Protection Clausep. 263
Securitization Constitutes a Violation of the Separation of Powers Doctrinep. 264
The Elements of Required New Regulationsp. 265
The Implications of Changep. 267
Conclusionp. 269
Referencesp. 270
Chapter 13 Recommendations for the Development of a Mortgage and Mortgage-Alternatives Market in the CIS Region, the CEE (Central and Eastern Europe) Region, and Chinap. 271
Surveys and Needs Assessmentp. 277
Coordination among Institutions in CIS/CEE Countries and Chinap. 278
Establishment of Mortgage and Real Estate Research Networks (Institutes)p. 279
The Mortgage-Alternatives Fundsp. 280
Legal Infrastructurep. 281
Credit Ratings Systemsp. 293
Taxationp. 298
Pension Reformp. 300
Accounting and Transparency/Disclosurep. 300
Central Banksp. 301
Mortgage Insurancep. 302
Home-Equity Mortgagesp. 303
Primary Mortgage Marketsp. 304
Creation of Secondary Mortgage-Alternatives Marketsp. 307
Statutory Ban of Traditional "Western" Securitizationp. 308
Alternatives to Foreclosurep. 308
The Price-Discovery Process and Viability of Mortgage-Alternatives Marketsp. 309
Monitoring Alternatives to Primary and Secondary Mortgage-Alternatives Marketsp. 311
Incentives for Banks and Financial Institutionsp. 314
Incentives for Borrowers/Buyers to Use Mortgage Alternativesp. 315
Risk-Management and Risk-Transfer Systemsp. 315
Referencesp. 316
Chapter 14 Asset-Liability Matching Is a Hindrance to Lendingp. 323
Errors in the Formulas for Duration, Modified Duration (MD), and Convexityp. 324
Default/Bankruptcy Risk and Illiquidityp. 330
Existing Liquidity Derivatives (Swaps and Options) Are Inaccurate and Inefficientp. 337
Possible Solutions to the Perceived ALM Problemp. 339
Constitutionality of Central Bank Restrictions on Daily Cash Withdrawals by Customersp. 341
Conclusionp. 344
Referencesp. 344
Chapter 15 New Mortgage-Alternative Products for Primary Mortgage Markets in China and CIS/CEE Countriesp. 349
The Adjustable Balance Mortgagep. 351
The Continuous Workout Mortgage, Shared Appreciation Mortgages (SAMs), Shared Income Mortgages (SIMs), and Shared Equity Mortgages (SEMs)p. 353
Traditional Alternative Mortgagesp. 354
Indexed Mortgagesp. 356
Islamic Finance Productsp. 357
Cooperative Mortgagesp. 359
The Pricing of Mortgages and Behavioral Finance-Most Models Are Inaccuratep. 359
Distortion of Economic Data and National Accountingp. 363
Banks/Lenders as Seller-Lenders (Installment Sales Contracts and Installment Land Contracts); and Banks as Real Estate Brokersp. 364
Renegotiation and Sequential Investmentsp. 368
Recursion of Mortgages and the Perception of Defaults as Low-Probability Eventsp. 372
Characterization of the New Mortgage-Alternative Productsp. 374
The New Mortgage-Alternative Productsp. 381
Conclusionp. 410
Notesp. 410
Referencesp. 411
Chapter 16 Conclusionp. 419
Referencesp. 421
About the Authorp. 423
Indexp. 425