Practical reasoning

The most recent addition to Routledge's series, "The Problems of Philosophy: Their Past and Present." Each book in the series opens with an examination of the history of a weighty philosophical problem and concludes with a detailed development of the author's own solution. The focus in this volume is the nature of practical reasoning and its bearing upon the rationality and explanation of intentional actions. Audi(University of Nebraska) devotes a chapter each to the works of Aristotle, Hume, and Kant on the topic; in each case, he provides a lucid, instructive exposition of the philosopher's chief contributions. In the remaining five chapters, with his characteristic clarity, argumentative rigor, and sensitivity to illuminating distinctions, Audi masterfully advances an account of practical reasoning, criteria for its assessment, and its bearing on intentional and rational action. These chapters, a major contribution to the philosophy of mind and action, promise to be of considerable use as well to ethicists and their students. Combining remarkable depth and precision with broad accessibility, Audi has produced an essential acquisition for any college or university library collection in philosophy. -A. R. Mele, Davidson College

Preface	p. viii
Acknowledgments	p. x
Introduction	p. 1
Part I Historical and conceptual background: practical reasoning in Aristotle, Hume, and Kant	p. 11
1 Aristotle on practical reasoning and the structure of action	p. 13
1 Deliberation	p. 13
2 The practical syllogism	p. 16
3 Weakness of will	p. 18
4 Practical and theoretical reasoning	p. 23
5 The explanation of action	p. 27
6 Intrinsically motivated action	p. 28
7 The structure of action	p. 30
8 The ultimate ground of action	p. 32
9 Conclusion	p. 34
2 Hume and the instrumentalist conception of practical reasoning	p. 37
1 The instrumental role of reason	p. 37
2 Reasoning as an element in the genesis of action	p. 41
3 Reasoning conceived as essentially comparative	p. 43
4 Reason, rational action, and moral judgment	p. 45
5 Weakness of will and Humean internalism	p. 48
6 Humean instrumentalism	p. 50
7 Conclusion	p. 53
3 Kant and the autonomy of practical reason	p. 57
1 Practical reason in the moral sphere	p. 57
2 Practical reasoning and intention in the application of the Categorical Imperative	p. 60
3 The motivational and normative power of reason	p. 64
4 Weakness of will and the conflict between reason and inclination	p. 68
5 The unity of practical and theoretical reason	p. 72
6 Conclusion	p. 74
Part II Practical reasoning, practical arguments, and intentional action	p. 79
4 The varieties and basic elements of practical reasoning	p. 81
1 The diversity of practical reasoning	p. 82
2 Practical reasoning, practical argument, and means-end inference	p. 86
3 Conclusions of practical reasoning	p. 89
4 A cognitive-motivational conception of practical reasoning	p. 92
5 Some basic schemata for representing practical reasoning	p. 96
6 Practical and theoretical reasoning	p. 99
7 Practical reasoning and actions for reasons	p. 102
5 Practical reasoning and intentional action	p. 105
1 The range of intentional action	p. 105
2 The phenomenology of reasoning	p. 106
3 The reconstructive role of practical arguments	p. 110
4 Inferentialism and the realization of practical arguments	p. 113
5 Unconscious and self-deceptive elements in practical reasoning	p. 116
6 Practical reasoning and reasoned action	p. 119
6 Practical reasoning in the dynamics of action	p. 122
1 The need for a dynamic account	p. 122
2 Practical reasoning as a causative process	p. 124
3 Perceptual and motivational triggers of action	p. 126
4 Causality, lawlike connections, and intentional action	p. 128
5 The dynamics of incontinence	p. 130
6 Causality and freedom	p. 133
Part III Practical reasoning, ethical decision, and rational action	p. 137
7 The assessment of practical reasoning	p. 139
1 The range of criteria for appraising practical reasoning	p. 139
2 Some patterns of practical reasoning	p. 140
3 Criteria for assessing practical reasoning	p. 144
4 A Kantian distinction generalized: basis in, vs. mere conformity with, practical reasoning	p. 145
5 Some applications of the criteria of assessment	p. 148
6 The defeasibility of practical reasoning	p. 150
7 Combination and compositionality in practical reasoning	p. 152
8 Rationality and relativity	p. 155
8 General principles of practical appraisal	p. 158
1 The normative power of moral reasons	p. 158
2 A range of substantive principles of practical reason and practical reasoning	p. 161
3 Hypothetical imperatives	p. 162
4 Three kinds of normative principle	p. 164
5 Two kinds of inference	p. 166
6 Toward sound practical principles	p. 168
9 Practical reasoning and moral judgment	p. 172
1 Moral judgment and moral decision	p. 173
2 A framework of moral principles	p. 176
3 Moral principles as constituents in practical reasoning	p. 178
4 Normative hierarchies	p. 181
10 Practical reasoning in ethical decisions	p. 187
1 The status of moral principles	p. 187
2 Sketch of a model for making difficult ethical decisions	p. 190
3 Practical reason, ethical decision, and morally justified action	p. 197
11 The rationality of action and the plurality of value	p. 200
1 The connection between practical reasoning and rational action	p. 200
2 Practical reasoning and rationalization	p. 203
3 Reasoned action, action for reasons, and normative grounds	p. 206
4 Aristotelian, Humean, and Kantian views of rational action	p. 210
5 A pluralistic conception of rational action	p. 213
Conclusion	p. 217
Notes	p. 224
Index	p. 245

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