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Library | Item Barcode | Call Number | Material Type | Item Category 1 | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Searching... | 30000010334502 | BP63.S33 H44 2010 | Open Access Book | Book | Searching... |
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Summary
Summary
Saudi Arabia, homeland of Osama bin Laden and many 9/11 hijackers, is widely considered to be the heartland of radical Islamism. For decades, the conservative and oil-rich kingdom contributed recruits, ideologues and money to jihadi groups worldwide. Yet Islamism within Saudi Arabia itself remains poorly understood. Why has Saudi Arabia produced so many militants? Has the Saudi government supported violent groups? How strong is al-Qaida's foothold in the kingdom and does it threaten the regime? Why did Bin Laden not launch a campaign there until 2003? This 2010 book presents the first ever history of Saudi jihadism based on extensive fieldwork in the kingdom and primary sources in Arabic. It offers a powerful explanation for the rise of Islamist militancy in Saudi Arabia and sheds crucial new light on the history of the global jihadist movement.
Author Notes
Thomas Hegghammer is a Senior Fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).
Reviews 1
Choice Review
Hegghammer (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment) provides an excellent account of the rise of the violent jihadist movement in Saudi Arabia. It is based on fieldwork in Saudi Arabia and primary research in Arabic for the author's doctoral dissertation. Through a meticulous examination of data and events, the author addresses and provides answers to important questions like the following: Why do so many militants come from this country? Has the government of Saudi Arabia provided support to violent groups? What is the power base and influence of al Qaeda in this country? In addition to rich analysis, the book provides valuable information on the socioeconomic background of Saudi militants from 1980 to 2006. Hegghammer uses a rational typology of Islamist activism to show the scope and depth of Saudi jihadists who are active around the world. Readers learn about pan-Islamism, classical jihadists, and the early al Qaeda, its growth and recruitment strategies, the structure of the organization, and the post-9/11 developments in this movement. Hegghammer also shows how jihad in Arabia failed but continues globally with tacit support from Saudi financial sources. Overall, this is a definitive study of jihadist movement, political Islam in Saudi Arabia, and political violence. Summing Up: Highly recommended. All readership levels. B. A. Yesilada Portland State University
Table of Contents
| List of figures and tables | p. vii |
| Acknowledgements | p. viii |
| A note on conventions | p. x |
| Introduction | p. 1 |
| 1 The politics of Pan-Islamism | p. 16 |
| The rise of pan-Islamism | p. 17 |
| The Afghan Jihad and the Saudi state | p. 24 |
| Pan-Islamist bidding games | p. 30 |
| 2 The classical Jihadists | p. 38 |
| Afghanistan, cradle of the jihadist movement | p. 38 |
| Jihad in Bosnia, the anticlimax | p. 48 |
| Tajikistan, Chechnya and the minor jihad fronts | p. 52 |
| 3 Recruitment to the early Jihad fronts | p. 59 |
| Hijazi domination | p. 59 |
| For the umma and the afterlife | p. 60 |
| Recruitment in the open | p. 65 |
| 4 Opportunities for global jihad | p. 70 |
| From the Burayda intifada to the 1995 Riyadh Bombing | p. 70 |
| Between police oppression and complacency | p. 74 |
| New pan-Islamist Causes | p. 78 |
| The rise of the al-Shu'aybi school | p. 83 |
| 5 Al-Qaida and Saudi Arabia | p. 99 |
| The global jihadists | p. 99 |
| The global jihadist doctrine and Saudi Arabia | p. 102 |
| Al-Qaida central | p. 108 |
| Al-Qaida in Saudi Arabia | p. 112 |
| 6 Recruitment to al-Qaida | p. 130 |
| Unemployment and 'Najdification' | p. 130 |
| Classical jihad exploited | p. 133 |
| Gatekeepers | p. 138 |
| 7 Post-9/11 Saudi Arabia | p. 143 |
| New symbols of Muslim suffering | p. 143 |
| Al-Qaida's scholars | p. 147 |
| From soft to hard policing | p. 155 |
| 8 The mujahidin on the Arabian Peninsula | p. 161 |
| Returning from Afghanistan | p. 161 |
| Al-Nashiri and al-Qaida's failed 2002 offensives | p. 166 |
| The al-Uyayri network | p. 170 |
| Launching the jihad | p. 180 |
| 9 Recruitment to the QAP | p. 186 |
| Boys of Riyadh | p. 186 |
| The Afghanistan factor | p. 189 |
| Anti-Americanism and companionship | p. 193 |
| Persuasion, incrimination and protection | p. 196 |
| 10 The failure of the jihad in Arabia | p. 199 |
| The aims of the QAP | p. 199 |
| Evolution of the campaign | p. 202 |
| Explaining the downfall of the QAP | p. 217 |
| Conclusion | p. 227 |
| Appendix 1 Socio-economic data on Saudi militants | p. 239 |
| Appendix 2 Chronology of Islamist violence in Saudi Arabia, 1979--2009 | p. 244 |
| Bibliography | p. 250 |
| Index | p. 277 |
